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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN FORK IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; PLEASANT
GROVE IRRIGATION COMPANY, a
corporation; and LEHI IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of
the State of Utah (successor in office of
Ed H. Watson, former State Engineer
of the State of Utah); KENNECOTT
COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation; UTAH POWER AND LIGHT
COMPANY, a corporation; SALT LAKE
CITY, a municipal corporation; UTAH
AND SALT LAKE CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation; NORTH JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTH JORDAN CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation; and EAST JORDAN
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
7626·

Defendants and AppeUants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT· OF FACTS
A brief, general statement of the matters which
divide us will aid in understanding the more detailed
facts to follow.
The first main ;point is as to whether the owner of an
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upper ·right to use water for direct application may store
it for later season use, when the lower users' rights depend uponthe rhn-off flow and se.epage water from such
direct application.
Whether, by their application to ''change the nature
of us·e," respondents may icquire the right to store the
early high water flows from American Fork Creek, and
return the water stored above for use by them in the later
·season, and for later drainage therefrom to Utah Lake.
Whether such application must be approved, because
of the fact that in some years waters are spilled or wasted .
from Utah Lake, prior to the irrigation season of appellants and other users from the Lake.
Whether the operation of such proposed plan would
result in (1) giving respondents additional water rights,
or (2) affecting lower users' as to their quantity or time
of use; and, whether such plan could feasibly, practicably,
or possibly be administered so as not to do one, or both,
of these.
Whether the problems of administration and distribution, imposed by this plan and by the Statutes are
administrative problems for determination or control by
the State Engineer, or legal problems for exclusive determination and control by the Trial Court. And, whether
administrative duties, which may not feasibly or possibly be exercised by· the State Engineer so as to protect
vested rights, may be imposed u:pon him by the Court.

The M·ater~al F~acts on the Above Matters are:
(As, the transcript is numbered separately, we will
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.,;

refer to the pages of it by use of the letter "T ", and to
the record by use of the letter '' R' '.)
Diligence Rights to the use of the waters of An1erican
Fork Creek, including the waters of the Silver Creek
Basin drainage channel thereto, as more directly here
involved, were acquired long prior to this application.
The respondents either owned, or controlled and administered, some of these rights. Their rights were and
are for direct irrigation, on lands in and around Pleasant
Grove, ~-llnerican Fork, and Lehi.
The rights of the appellant companies in waters in
and from Utah Lake were, likewise, acquired long prior
to this application. The so-called five '' Asso.ciation
Canals" include Salt Lake City and the four Canal Companies named. They each maintain and o:perate their
canals and irrigation systems in Salt Lake Connty, for
distribution to and use by their members and users there.
Substantially all irrigation in said County is from Utah
Lake. The Kennecott Copper Corporation uses its waters
for both irrigation and industrial purposes. The water
reaches these canal systems through the Jordan River.
All the waters available from Utah Lake have been fully
appropriated, and the waters therefrom have been, for
many years, insufficient to supply the rights thereto
(T·. 309-314).
In 1946, respondents filed, in the State Engineer's
Office, their change ·application, A-1945, here involved
(Ex. "B"). The Engineer, after hearings, entered his
decision, denying the application, and stating his findings
and reasons therefor (R. 45-48). On appeal therefrom,
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the District Court of Utah County entered its findings
and judgment, reversing the State Engineer, and ordering him to reinstate the application and to proceed with
the propos·ed storage plan (R.119).
This application, as amended, sought to withhold
and store, between April 1st and June 15th each year,
1,000 acre feet of water, to be withheld or ''changed''
from direct flow to the proposed reservoir at the rate of
35 cfs. This would take, if continuous, .about 14 or 15
days. 'The application recites that the "drainage area to
which the source of supply belongs" is "Utah Lake and
Jordan River." The water stored is to be released between April 1st" and October 30th.
The proposed reservoir site is about 14 miles (T.
21) above and northeasterly from respondents' diversion
weir, at the point where American Fork Creek emerges
from the canyon. This reservoir site is at an elevation
of 9,000 to 9,500 feet (T. 215-216). The snow reaches
substantial depth up there, and stays until about June.
Access to this site, in part or all of the period of April
1st to June 15th, ean be had only by use of snow shoes.
The run-off from the snow there starts about l\fay or
June, and continues to about July (T. 218).
In addition to the legal limitation of respondents'
diligence rights to that quantity of water beneficially
used at the time of its acquirement, and to the statutory
limitation to the quantity of water required for beneficial
use at any and all times, the capacity of respondents'
diversion ditches from American Fork Creek places a
maximum limitation upon their right.
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The capacity of the Lehi diversion ditch was and
is about 100 efs.: the extent of the American Fork rights
of respondents' shareholders is about 80 cfs. (T. 35, 71);
the capacity of the Pleasant Grove ditch is 100 cfs. ~T.
43, 82) ; a total maximum capacity and total maximum
water which can be diverted and used, at any· tune, of
approxiinately 300 cfs. ( T. 35, 42). Waters that cannot
be taken out to Lehi and Pleasant Grove go down the
American Fork area, to supply about 5,000 acres.
This n1aximum is a substan~ial portion of the high
water flow in the Creek, at the point of diversion, but is
not nearly all of it. \Vhether the capacity of these diversion ditches may be required for beneficial use, or
what portion thereof may be so required at any time,
depends upon the changing conditions from season to season, and from day to day.
The waters, except for such diversion, would flow
directly to the Lake, a distance of about 7 Tniles. Water,
whi0h is diverted and used, naturally drains toward the
Lake. The portion thereof that may reach the Lake, and
the tin1e at which it may do so, depends upon the condition of the soil on which it is used, the extent of use and
re-use, and the condition of the weather, and the affect of
this upon loss by evaporation, and the condition, character, and state of growth of the crops, as to what moisture ma~, be taken up by these in transpiration losses
(T. 134-135, 1-1-1-, 209-213, 320-321,334-339, 359).
The nature of this irrigated area, as to slope, is
somewhat comparable to a section of a saucer. The arc
of the outside rim of this portion centers roughly at the
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point of diversion from American Fork Creek. The
westerly portion of the arc, in the direction of the Lehi
ditch, circles out and gradually down to the Lake shore,
at a point south of Lehi. The easterly portion of the arc,
in the direction of the Pleasant Grove diversion, circles
out and down to the Lake southwesterly from Pleasant
Grove. The area is enclosed by higher ground, near each
of the ends .of the arc. The American Fork ditches serve
the central area.
The slope of the saucer is generally toward the Lake.
The natural ehannel of American Fork Creek below
A1n:erican Fork is not used to carry all the undiverted
waters of this Creek at the diversion point. Artificial
channels take out portions, or all, of these waters to the
westerly side for milling, and other purposes (T. 34).
Also, due to the lower elevation of the mill pond, known
as "i\1ulliner's Pond," and to the topography, as shown
by the topographical ma·p (Ex. "11"), a large portion of
these diverted waters flow to this pond, and thence,
through "Spring Creek" (Lehi), to the Lake (T. 43-44,
48). 8ee, also, the maps (Exs. "10", "15") for these
locations, and the elevation contours.
There are approximately 5024 acres in the American
Fork system irrigable area (T. 57); 7000 acres in the Lehi
area (T. 109); and 5000 acres in the Pleasant Grove
area ( T. 80). The latter two areas have other natural
sources of irrigation water. All of the areas have access
to D·eer Creek Reservoir water. (See Ex. '' 15'' for
course of channel.) Both Lehi and Pleasant Grove areas
use Deer Creek ReS>ervoir water (T. 109-110).
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The irrigated lands, in the whole area, fall into three
classes:

1.

2.

3.

The upper bench lands, ~onsisting of about 3800
acres, are of porous soil, and have no sustained
water table level. The seepage and run-off from
these is rapid (T. 143-144, 209-210).
The intermediate land, consisting of about
5, 700 acres, where the level of the water table
varies frmn a few feet below to near, or at, the
surface.
The bottom lands, of about 6500 acres, where
the water table is at the surface a good deal of
the time, hut which is irrigated in later season
(T. 212-213) .

In the later irrigation season the seepage and waste
waters are continuously picked up in waste ditches, and
the water re-used throughout the area and throughout
the irrigation season (T. 213, 68). There are several
users having rights secondary to appellants' for lower
uses in this area (T. 57, 68-71, 81). The three res:pondents
have different rights, as between themselves, as to the
proportion of the Creek flow each shall get in the high
water and in the later low water s·easons ( R. 8).
More Directly on t.he Qwa.ntity of Water
Americarn Fork Creek, the Records show:

Ava.i~able

from

That high water flows are in May and June.
The U. S. Geological Survey took readings on this
flow (Ex. "4") each day for each' nwnth from 1927 to
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1948, inclusive, at a point just above a power plant, about
4.10 miles above the mouth of the canyon (T. 190).
The following table shows the maximum recorded
flows in May and .June oif each of these 22 years, with the
year, month, da~,, and quantity of flow at this point, as
follows:

Year
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942 .
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948

MAY
Day
17
27
25
29
16
21
31
8
27
15
18
29
4 and 31

17

26
26
3
15
13
6
8
28

JUNE

Cfs.
429
339
298
168
124
314
257
65
241
335'
346
318
190
210
285
265
184
301
275
269
341
399

Year
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948

Day
8
1
16
8
1
23
3
1
13
1
22
3
1
1
7
10
1
2
23
6
8
2

Cfs.
370
341
326
149
76
258
300
28
306
250
243
303
181
120
250
232
208
326
289
200
231
356

It will be seen that the peak flows are usually reached
between May 15th and June 3rd. Only in 1935 and 1945
were they reached after June 3rd. In most years, the
maximum is reached in the last half of May.
A check of Ex. "4" will also show that the April
Creek flows at this point are very much below those of
May and June, although in two very exceptional years
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they were higher. April 2-1, 1930, the flow hit 193 cfs.,
as again~t a ).fay high of 168 efs.; and on April 30, 1946,
it hit a high flow of 269 efs., as against a May high of
229 efs. that year.
'The Inean 22-year flows are: for April - 70.8 cfs.,
for 1[ay- 170.64 cfs., and for June- 165.8-1 cfs. Incidentally, it i~ 72.94 cfs. for July, which is a little bit above
the mean for .A. pril.
There is a substantial make in the flow of the Creek
between this point of measurement, near the upper power
plant, and the flow at the respondents' point of diversion,
near the nwuth of the canyon. The distance is 4.10 miles
( T. 190). In order to get at the flow at this diversion
point, this increase is determined by comparing the readings in Ex. · · -1'' with those taken in some of these same
years at the point of diversion. Allowing for a naturally
heavier early run-off in the lower four n1iles, in the
early spring, the increas·e of flow in this distance, while
substantial, is fairly constant.
A natural pattern of a greater percentage of make
m the lower four miles in the late winter or spring
months, when the lower snows were melting, and less
make in the late summer and fall when the higher snow
waters supply the creek and the lower areas are dry,
is reflected in these exhibits.
Since it is alleged (R. 9) that the purpose is to withhold the 35 cfs. from the "high water" flows; and it is
also admitted or established that as these high water
flows at the diversion point substantially exceed 300
cfs. and approach or exceed 400 cfs., the entir·e 35 cfs.,
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if not withheld, would rea;c;h the lake immediately, it becomes important to find how frequently these larger
flows occur.
Respondents alleged (R. 7) 'that, in the summer and
latter part of the irrigation season, the flow is reduced
to a volume not to exceed 30 cfs.
Respondents' expert, taking 2 years (1914, 1938) for
illustration, calculated that of all the water passing its
weir in a year, 36% passed in May and 29% in Juneleaving only 35% for the remaining 10 months (T. 395).
The record shows (Ex. "4") that, in the 22 years
that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) took
reading, about 4 miles above the diversion point, readings were also taken at the diversion point in 5 of these
years by Mr. Searle, respondent's water master (Ex.
'' L' ') ; and in 3 of these 22 years by the State Engineer
(Ex. '' 7' ') ; and in 1 of these years by David Gardner,
Engineer (Ex. " CC ").
For comparison, therefore, we have collected the
concurrent high water readings so taken at the diversion
point, and have set opposite these the USGS measurements for May and June, the months in which they occurred, in the following table:
MAY READINGS

Cfs.
Gardner
399.5
State Eng.
594
209
215

JUNE READINGS

Cfs.

Day

Year

Day

USGS
243

17

1938

2

253
190
210

16
31
17

1938
1939
1940

3
1
1

Cfs.

Cfs.

Gardner
399.5
State Eng.
430
184
133

USGS
295'

303
181
120
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Searle
375
423
285
399
473

301 15 1944
255 11 1945
260
5 1946
(Av.) 300.5 4,5 1947
319 22 1948

2
23
6
9
3

Searle
400
307
204 ('storm)
254
399

326
289
200
220
349

This shows that ~lay is uniformly the high water
month; that the average increase at the point of diversion over the upper readings is just a fraction under
45%. That is to say, that 45% of the USGS reading,
added to it, will give the quantity flow in this month at res-pondents' point of diversion. And by this ·computation,
when there is 276 cfs. at the higher point, the rate of flow
at the point of diversion will amount to 400 cfs.
Ex. "4" shows that the reading of 276 cfs. by USGS
and, therefore, the discharge of the Creek at the point
of diversion exceeded 400 cfs. in 11 years out of the 22
years, which we have for comparison. These 11 years,
and the days when the May readings ·exceeded 276 cfs.,
are:

~

/

•)
/

j
~

1927- 6
1928- 5
1929- 1
1932- 9
1936- 10
1937-15
1938- 5
1941- 1
1944- 3
1947- 6
1948-16

days
days
day
days
days
days
days
day
days
days
days
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We point out, also, that in 5 additional years the
USGS ·reading reached, or exceeded, 27 4 cfs., which would
make the lower flow within a few cfs. of 400 cfs., and
that, in 1941 and 1946, the USGS reading reached 270 cfs.
and 269 cfs., so that, in is out of the 22 years, the high
water discharge at the mouth of the canyon would either
approximate or exceed 400 cfs.
There should he added, also, the same comparison
on the same computation based upon 350 cfs., which is in
excess of the capacity of the respondents' canals; and,
also, a si1nilar comparison in computation on 300 cfs.,
which is the approximate capacity of these canals, and
of respondents' maximuin a'p•propriations.
These are added because substantially the same situation on the direct flows to the Lake, if not withheld, applies when the discharge reaches these figures. On this,
the f'aine comparison shows that 241 cfs. at the USGS
point of Ineasurmnent will produce 350 cfs. at the point
of distribution, and, also, that, in 15 out of the 22 years,
the USGS Ineasurement exceeded 241 cfs;, and did so
for a considerable nu1nber of days, in each of these years,
during .Jlay. Also, that a reading of 207 cfs. at the upper
point would 1nake 300 cfs. at the lower point of diversion,
and that 207 cfs. passed the upper point in 17 of the 22
years, and that this occurred on a con~iderable number of
days, in Inost of these years, during May.
While we have set up above the month of June as well
as May, for comparison, in showing the readings taken
at the point of diversion, June is not so very important on
this point, as very few high water peaks are then reached;
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and, under the application A-1945, there could be no
withholding anyway after June 15th.
~\s

stated above, the percentage of increase in June
is less, due, perhaps, to the the snow being out in the
lower canyon areas. However, in making a similar comparison, the Searle reading of June 23, 1945, should he
eliminated, as that comes after the 15th; and the reading for June 6, 1946, should also be eliminated, because
he shows (Ex. · · L' ') that this was abnormal, due to
"storm.~·

Thus, we arrive on the readings in this month at a
23% increase, between these two points. On this basis,
-100 cfs. would have been ex.ceeded in 1927 - 8 days; 1941
-1 day: and 1948- 3 days. In 1948, it was, in fact, 473
cfs. (See Ex. "L").
Also, there are a considerable number of years in
which the capacity of respondents' canal, at the diversion
point, was exceeded in June, as the comparison and
calculations show.
Lake Inflows:
Some surface run-off inflows to the Lake, in this
area, were measured by Mr. Gardner, an Engineer (T.
193), for the last half of 1937, as well as for 1938, 1939,
and 1940 (Ex. "6"). This report of measurement shows
the monthly acre feet flows, and does not show daily
flow. It shows the streams measured, and his map (Ex.
"11 ") shows the location of each of these inflows. There
is no information available as to the total quantity of
run-off waters in this area, and, of course, no measurement of seepage waters that reach the Lake. It appears
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that this seepage, and other inflows, cannot be actually
measured. (See the Lake Commissioner's report for
1936, at page 7).
As stated a;bove, at the extreme Lehi end of this area,
and also at the Pleasant Grov·e end, other waters came
into these channel inflows. At the Lehi end, however,
these waters in Bull Pasture Drain and Lehi City Drain
(Ex. •' 6' ') are significant. At the Pleasant Grove end,
however, the outside waters through the Geneva Cannery
Drain were substantial (T. 208).
To get the measured surface inflows that came from
American Fork Creek drainage, perhaps one-half of the
Geneva Cannery Drain should be deducted. However,
for the purpose of comparison of these flows with the
flow in American Fork Greek, to determine the direct
aff.ect of the latter flows upon the Lake inflows, this deduction is of no importance, and would make no substantial difference as to this.
It so happens that, of the three years in which these
flows were measured, 1938 is the only large flow year,
and the only year in which there were substantial high
water flows in the high water months (Ex. "4"). This
exhibit, covering the USGS measurements on the Creek,
show 318 cfs. for May 29th, and a mean flow for that
month of 194 cfs. In 1939, the highest flow was 190 cfs.,
for May 30th, and the mean was 148 cfs. In 1940, the
highest was 210 cfs., and the mean was 147 cfs. And, as
pointed out above, on May 7, 1938, there was a reading
at respondents' po·int of diversion (Ex. "CC ") of 399.5
cfs.
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The Lake inflows in the early n1onths of March and
April are clearly affected by the adjacent sno'v run-off.
The following comparative readings are taken from Ex.
'"6" and Ex. "'-±", and show the Lake inflows and the
FSGS measuren1ents in ~ere feet, and, also, the mean
rates of flow in cfs.:
MARCH

APRIL

Acre ft.

Cfs.

Acre ft.

Cfs.

4590
922
4826
1060
3530
1010

74.03
15
77.84
17.2
57
16.4

5316
5520
4266
4540
4160
3240

88.60
92.7
71.10
76.3
69.3
54.5

1938 Lake
USGS
1939 Lake
USGS
1940 Lake
USGS

Like comparison for the months of May, June, and
July show the effect of the Creek flows on the inflows into
the Lake, particularly in the high water year of 1938, as
follows:
MAY
Acre ft.

JUNE
Cfs.

1938 Lake
7668 123.68
USGS 11904 194.
1939 Lake
3756
60.58
USGS 9080 148.
1940 Lake 2459
39.6
USGS 9040 147.

Acre ft. Cfs.

5341
12470
3322
6100
1247
4160

89.02
210.
55'.37
103.
27.8
69.9

JULY
Acre ft. Cfs.

4017
4730
1466
2550
789
1660

64.79
77.
23.64
41.5
12.7
27.1

It appears to he agreed, as it must, that in periods
when the water table is high the run-off is greater and
more direct, and the foregoing comparison clearly shows
that, in the high water season of 1938, a more substantial
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portion of the Cre·ek flows went immediately to the Lake.
Incidentally, it appears (Ex. "6") that in l\Iay, 1938,
A1nerican Fnrk Creek and "Spring Creek" (Lehi)
rneasured 2640 aere feet. These are the more direct channels to the Lake. Also, that in 1939 and 1940, at the
lower Creek flow:-;, these measured only 70 acre feet and
43 acre feet, respectively.
rrhis comparison, and these exhibits, also show that,
as the heavier irrigation diversions occur, the Lake surface inflows diminish, in comparison with the Creek
inflows. This begins in June, and continues sharply into
Jul~·, and reaches its lowest in August, after which the
inflow, or seepage, from irrigation to the Lake commences to increase.
1

}_j xplana.tion

of Calculations:

In converting acre feet to cubic s·econd feet, where
both are not shown in the exhibits, we have followed
the regular formula; i.e., that 1 cfs. flow, for 1 day, will
equal 1.98 acre feet. But, in doing this, and for easy
figuring, as is usually done, we have used 2.00, instead
of 1.98, acre feet. This results in a very slightly lower
cfs. figure.
There is evidence in the record of the estimates by
the Utah Lake Water Commissioner of the total calculated inflows to the Lake from all the sources surrounding it. But, as this seems to us to have no materiality,
we will not burden the statement with these figures.
They are found in the Commissioner's Annual Reports,
in evidence.
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The ]fa.tter of TFithdratcal.-:, or Losses, f'rout the Lake:

A principal loss of water frOin Utah Lake results
frOin 8nrface evaporation. This, as estimated and reported by the Lake Connnissioner ( T. 233-236, and see
:278), averages about 231,000 acre feet between .May 1st
and September 1st, as compared to about 207,000 acre
feet drawn therefrom through the Jordan River, and
di:::;tributed by the Commissioner, to supply the various
uses entitled thereto. This is the matter referred to by
the State Engineer, wher·e he says that Utah Lake rights
are made up ''by the difference behveen that which can
be diverted and used, and the supply.''
The total water thus available has not been sufficient to :::;upply such rights, at least since 1936. ('T. 309314). The Commissioner's reports show that, for this
reason, water has been leased by the Utah Lake users
from \V eber River sources, and conveyed to them to and
through the Provo River, when available. It is shown
that all available water has been us·ed, and a good deal
of trenching done, to draw water to the pumps, and an
additional pumping station placed down at Pelican
Point, in order to drain that low area. There is practically no water received through the Jordan River for
irrigation purposes, except that which is pun11ped from
the Lake to the River. Practically none flows by gravity.
The evidence shows a comparison between what the
evaporation would be on the proposed reservoir, as
compared with what it would he on the added surface
of the Lake, if the 1,000 acre feet were allowed to pass
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down to the Lake in the usual way. The evidence on
this is that the increase in area of the Lake would be
about the same as the area of the proposed reservoir,
and little importance is attached as to any difference
on this (T. 124).
Over the ohjection of the appellants, respondents
introduced evidence of so-called "waste" of water from
Utah Lake in the early Spring. On this, the evidence
shows that, under the '' Colladge Decree'' (See Salt Lake
City v. CoUadge, 13 Utah 522 (1896) ), the Utah Lake
and Jordan River Commission was set up, and it regulates the level of the Lake water, so as to avoid flooding
of the adjacent lands (T. 300, 348-353). When it appears
that such flooding may occur, the Commission has the
authority to open the gate from the Lake to the River,
to permit waters to spill, and that has been done to
some extent during 1948, 1949, and 1950, the only years
since 1924. In 1950, the water being spilled in March
was being used by Kennecott Copper ( T. 301). The Lake
users have no control over such regulation or release of
water.
Likewise over objection, evidence was introduced as
to the extent of the alleged use of waters by users from
Utah Lake, in excess of what was claimed was or should
be reasonably required. The ciaim is that, as to the
Commissioner's report on diversions to East Jordan
Irrigation Company, there was indicated an excessive
use of water, in proportion to the acreage indicated.
While we do not consider this of any materiality,
as to the application here involved, as is indicated by
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the Co1nn1issioner's report for 1937 (Ex. "P "), at page
9 thereof, both Salt Lake City water anJ Draper Irrigation Co1npany water is diverted through the J1Jast
Jordan Canal. And, it is also indicated in these reports
that there are exchanges, as between the canal cmnpanies,
when water is badly needed by one and not needed b~'
the other, although it is charged to the one having the
right to use it.

THE

POINTS

PRESENTED

AND

RELIED

UPO~ ~-\_RE:

1. Res,pondents may not, by a change of nature of
use application, acquire rights to store early high water
for use on their san1e lands in the later,_ hotter, and drier
months, when lower Utah Lake rights depend upon the
drainage fron1 respondents' use, by direct application;
and, even though water 1nay, at times, spill or waste
from Utah Lake, prior to the irrigation season. (The
findings in this regard do not support the decree.)

2. The record discloses that the proposed plan for
diversion and storage would interfere with the rights of
lower users both as to volume and as to time of use.
(The evidence does not support the findings.)
3. The proposed rplan of diversion, storage, and
distribution ( 1) cannot be so administered as to insure
that the rights of lower users will not be injuriously
affected, and ( 2) the State J1Jngineer 's determination
that it cannot be administered so as to avoid such injury
is controlling, and (3) his statutory duty of administration cannot arbitrarily be controlled by the Trial Court.
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(The decree is not supported by evidence or findings, and
is against law.)
ARGUMENT
The State Engineer's well-·considered opinion dis,cusses matters material to the argument on all three
points (Ex. "12"). We quote:
' ' The evidence presented at the hearing, together with the general information available in
the office of the State Engineer, demonstrates
that the proposed change could interfere sub-stantially with the vested rights of others. While,
as noted above, the right of an applicant to change
his nature of use is absolute, if it will not interfere, the law is equally clear that the applicant
may not enlarge his basic .right by the filing of a
change application. If the application in effect
constitutes an attempted enlargement of the right,
it amounts to a new appropriation without going
through the procedure outlined by statute. The
applicant n1ust not, therefore, get more water
than would have been available to it under the
mother right. See Tanner v. Humphreys, supra,
and Rocky Ford Irrigation Comparny v. Kents
Lake Reservoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P.
2d 108.
''Whether or not there will be interference
with rights already established, whether they be
junior or senior, depends largely upon the manner in which the storage is administered by a
public official acting as commissioner. In all storages like unto the one involved here, i.e. rights in
Utah Lake are made up in many instances by the
difference between that which cam be diverted
and used and the supply.
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'• .A. direct flow user can only use that portion
to which hi~ rig-ht entitled hin1, subject to the
vagaries of weather, eonditions of crop, etc. Other
flow rights may he also supplied in part in this
same manner. * * * If this alpplication were
granted, the diversion and storage on the stream
would of necessity be operated in such manner
that the water could only be stored in the proposed reservoir when it ·could otherwise be beneficially used by direct diversion and further limited to legally established direct flow practices.
''The approval of the application granting
the right to store the water represented by flow
rights would impose upon an administrator the
obligation o.f determining, as mentioned hereinbefore, when weather conditions on the ground
would or would not permit the use of wate-r by
direct diversion in applying it to beneficial use
and time when the applicant would not or could
not, by reason of other conditions, use the water
in whole or in part by direct diversion. This
determination from day to day and from time
to time would impose a rp~ractical impossibility
upon an administrator. To not limit storage to
times when the water could or would otherwise
be used by direct diversion, as set out, would be
an enlargement of the original right which cannot be permitted under a change application.
"It appears, in this instance, that there is no
unappropriated water in this source on Jordan
River downstream from Utah Lake. * * *
"However, it is the State Engineer's duty
to reject the application, as it is impractical of
operation to the end that others would be adversely affected thereby, as outlined above. The application is, therefore, rejected as of this date and
returned to the applicant so endorsed.''
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POINT I.

Res,pondents may no't, by a change of nat111re of use
applica;tion, acquire rights to st;ore early high water for
use on their same larnds in the later, hoUer, arwl drier
months, when lower Utah Lake rights depend upon the
drainage from respondents' right of use, by dilrect applic:ation; and, ecen though water may, at times, spill Of"
waste from Ut,ah Lake, prior to the irrig'ation season.
{The findings in this regard do not support the
decree.)
The practice of storing water in natural or artificial
reservoirs in this State has heretofore related to the
storage of unappropriated water. The applications
usually involv~ both the appropriation of the water to
be stored and the approval of the proposed reservoir
facilities for such storage. These are both provided for
under our statutes. The State Engineer has the extra
burden, as to any artificial reservoir project, to determine whether or not the proposed operation can be
lawfully and feasibly carried on. Otherwise, large sums
of water users' money may be uselessly expended.
This application, A-1945, is merely a change appli.cation. In 100-3-2, as to appropriation, in discussing
merely the requirement that the application shall state
the ''point of diversion,'' says:
"The storage of water by means of a reservoir shall be regarded as a diversion, * * • ''
The other statute dealing with reservoirs is 100-3-12,
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the section which deals with construction of irrigation
works.
No additional right to the use of any water can 'be
acquired directly or indirectly by a change application.
As stated by the Engineer, such applicant ''must not
• • * get more water than would have been available
to it under the mother right.'' Nor should the application be approved if it would "permit the applicant to
store water it would not have used by direct flow diversion," or "if the application in effe'C't constitutes an
attempted enlargement of the right * * *.''
This is a defect that inheres in the ''effect'' of this
ap-plication under the proposed plan. And this is in no
way dependent upon the question of injury to the protestants here, 'because an application to appropriate
water for storage would clearly affect other classes,
including all the secondary rights on Utah Lake, 'and
would involve entirely different objections and a different case.
Another fundamental and elementary principle is
that respondents' direct flow irrigation right itself is
limited to the amount beneficially used at the time of
and in the acquirement of such right; and is also limited
to the amount of water required for necessary beneficial
use, within such right, at any and all times. As the
Engineer says, in his opinion:
''A direct flow user can only use that portion
to which his right entitles him subject to the
vagaries of weather, condition of crop, etc.''
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In Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) 882, the
opinion by Judge Wolfe points out at Page 894 that
the Legislature by Sec. 100-3-3 (the change application
statute) did not intend to change Sec. 100-1-3 that:
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
1neasure, and the limit of all rights to the use of
water in this State.''
This opinion, at this page, contains a very good
analysis and discussion on this point, and, also, on the
duty of the State Engineer in connection with change
applications.

M10ore, et ,az. v. California-Oregon Power Co., 140
P. (2) 798, cites, at Page 805, a number of authorities
on the point that the extent of use or enjoyn1ent measures
the right, and says:
"In order to gain a right to the waters the
diverter must actually use it, and the q'/1,(J,(Ybtity
used measures the extent of his right."

Basic Error:
Now, it is 1n connection with the real nature and
lirni ts to this change application that the basic error
in the contentions of the respondents, and in the finding
of the Court, occurs.
This resulted from evidel\ce offered and received
to the effect that in three years, before the irrigation
season, and in February and March, ~and one year in
April, water spilled from Utah Lake into Jordan River,
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to preYent flooding of land8 adjacent to the Lake. This
wns done under a previous decision of this Court in the
Colladge case, supra. These were the only year8, a.t
least from l~l:2-! to 19-!9, in which this occurred.
This line of evidence was repeatedly objected to
by us, on the ground that any excess waters of Utah
Lake, and the rights of the appropriators therein, or
thereto, were in no way involved in this application.
This seemed obvious to us, as it was to the State Engineer, who stated, in his opinion (Ex." 12"):
·'It appears, in this instance, that there i8
no unappropriated water in this source on J ordan River down-stream from Utah Lake. Therefore, this case * * * does not involve unappropriated water down-stream on .Jordan River frmn
Utah Lake."
The protesting Associated Canals take their water
on the upper end of the Jordan River, the farthest north
point of diversion being the head-gate of the North
Jordan Irrigation Company.
The theory of respondents was that, if some water
spilled into the Jordan River and passed beyon:d our
diversions, we could not complain if a portion of American Fork Creek water were held back from the Lake,
in this proposed reservoir.
In the first place, this application is not an application to appropriate, or even to store, water which
would otherwise escape front Utah Lake and the Jordan
River into Great Salt Lake; and, in the second place,
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any unappropriated water so escaping could not be
reached or made available or he affected in any way by
this change application.
It may be added here that there is also no evidence
as to what lportion of such ''spilled'' water had already
been appropriated, or might he put to ·a benefici~ use
lorwer down the River. It does appear that the appellant
Copper Company used some of this water, which was
released prior to the irrigation season (T. 301).
And, it clearly appears that any water spilled was
prior to the proposed withholding here, whieh could not
he before A1IJ'ril 15th, and would ordinarily he in the
latter half of May. The proposed withholding would,
therefore, not affect any water allegedly wasted from
Utah Lake. And, since the irrigation season out of
Utah Lake uniformly commences about the early part of
May this proposed withholding would concur with, and
would adversely affect the then use of water from Utah
Lake for irrigation.
As further illustrating the impossibility of sustaining the decree on this ground, we call attention to the
fact that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, under priority
date of April 3, 1936, filed application 12114 in the Office
of the State Engineer to exchange 30,000 acre feet of
water which, it claimed, would accrue to Utah Lake by
reason of irrigation in this area from Deer Creek
Reservoir water, from the Weber River and other foreign sources, for 30,000 acre feet to be held back in the
Deer Creek Reservoir on Provo River. This application
was approved by the State Engineer July 23, 1941, on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
the theory of the application that additional water would
accrue, as it has. to Utah Lake over and above all of the
natural supply thereto, as :previously appropriated.
Under the decisions of the Court in Lehi I rrigatiow
Oo. r. Jo-nes, et al., 202 P. (2) 892, and McGarry v.
Thompson, 201 P. (2) 288, this Court may take judicial
notice of this application and action. Thus, any water
that may spill from Utah Lake is subject to this application, and to the withholding thereunder, in anticipation
of any probable spilling. It is also subject to any other
appropriation applications that have been, or may be,
filed thereon.
The Utah Lake and Jordan River Commission has
sufficient trouble already down there, in trying to determine, in advance, whether the Lake will not re,~ch compromise, and therefore the water may all be held back;
or whether, if the gates are not opened in time, the Lake
will flood the surrounding lands. Appellants have nothing to do with it, and neither do respondents.
In any event, these respondents could make no
elaim in reference to the alleged surplus waters of the
Lake, except 'by an application to ~appropriate ; and
such an application would be subject to the claims of
all prior applicants or appropriators.
Sec. 100-1-1 provides that the waters of this State
are the !property of the public, and 100-3-1 recites that
no right to the use of water can be acquired, e~cept by
application to appropriate, in the manner as provided
in 100-3-2, whic:h also recites that, in order to acquire
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a right to the use of any unappropriated water, application must be made, as in that section provided.
Likewise, appellants objected to a similar character
of testimony offered hy respondents, in an attempt to
prove that some of the users of water from Utah Lake
wasted water by using more than was beneficially required.
We objected to this line of testimony on the same
grounds ·as we did to the alleged waste from the Lake,
and also upon the ground that the State Engineer,
through Commissioners appointed by him, distributes
and controls and regulates the use of water by such
users, and he could, and presumptively would, properly
limit any su,ch uses.
Clearly, and for the same reasons above stated, any
such waters could not be reached by this application,
and such matters are, oh:viously, unrelated to the issues
presented here.
Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362. This
case held that, on appeal from the decision of the State
Engineer, the District Court which hears the matter
de nova ·can do no more than the State Engineer; and,
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues are limited
to those which guide the State Engineer in approval or
rejection of an application. This claim, relating to waters
out of Utah Lake, is not mentioned in the aJpplication.
Furthermore, and it is of great importance here on
this and other points at issue, to note that no right
is acquired until the issuance of a final certificate of
permit of change of the nature of use by the State EngiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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neer. And, in this connection, 100-3-17 U.C.A. 1943 says,
as to this:
''The certificate shall not extend the rights
described in the application.''
It is plain, we think, that the above matters, as to
the waters from Utah Lake, are in no way involved in
this application, and that it was error to reverse the
Engineer on the basis of such contention and evidence
and findings as to any such alleged waste of water.
It is impossible to determine from the findings and
decision of the Trial Court whether. the intention was
to reverse the State Engineer upon the immediately
foregoing issue alone, or whether the decision also challenges the decision of the State Engineer that the effect
of the changed operation would be to give respondents an
added use; and that the proposed operation would injure
the existing rights, and could not be administered so as
not to do so.
Under the authorities cited, a diligence right for
direct flow irrigation would not include, or justify, or
constitute a right of storage. It may be contended, however, that, if the storage does not enlarge the acquired
right, or infringe on existing rights, this kind of change
may be authorized. Under the next Points, II and III,
we shall show that, on the Record, this change cannot be
made, as the Engineer has decided, without the effe~t
of enlarging respondents' right and infringing upon the
existing rights of alppellants, and others.
At this point, we will cite the cases which we have
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found, dealing with withholding by an upper direct user,
for later use by him; and .holding generally that such
may not he legally done, where vested rights to the
run-off from direct flow use are involved.
So far as we have been able to find, this question
has not been considered by the Courts of this State.
And we have found no case anywhere passing directly
upon the powers and duties of the State Engineer, as to
a proposal of this character..
In 1910, J. E. Ethell, a Colorado attorney who has
written extensively on irrigation law, contributed an
Article-71 Central Law Journal 58-in which he stated
that the question of whether an ''owner of a prior righ~
to water for direct application (is) privileged to store
for future use,'' said that only two cases had been
decided on the question:
Williams v. AltmJovw (Or.), 95 P. 200;
Seven Lakes Reservroiu- Co. v. New Loveland
Etc. Co. (Colo.), 93 P. 485.

He indicates that the former case held that such
an owner could be so privileged, and that the latter
(Colo.) case held that he could. While neither of the
cases is exactly in point, they may be of help here.
In the Colorado case, the defendant reservoir company was incorporated for, and was engaged in, acquiring and maintaining reservoirs for storage. It did not
attempt, as here, to withhold a portion 'Of its previously
acquired direct flow right. There was no question of
appropriation of new water either, but it acquired two
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
existing water rig·hts for purposes of storage, and proceeded to store this water for uses later in the season
than that to which it had been previously applied hy
the owners.
This was apparently a part of a large supply, from
a large source. and there was no question in the case
as to the previous, or any drainage or run-off from the
direct flow use thereof. The opinion held that, as to
the rights acquired, the former use had 'been entirely
abandoned.
The opinion also repeats that their otperation was
and could be '·in no manner detrimental'' to the rights
of the plaintiff, and that, by the change, ''no greater
burden is imposed upon the common source of supply.''
The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court, which
had held to the contrary, but reversed it only as to the
new rights acquired.
Colorado Milling and Elevator Co. v. Larimer amd
Weld Irrig·ation Co. (Colo.), 56 P. 185. This case is not
mentioned in the previous Colorado case, probably for
the reason, as indicated therein, that no lower rights
were there affected by the storage.
In this case, there was a conflict. The irrigation
company had a right for irrigation prior in time to
the milling company's right for power purposes. The
suit by the milling company arose when the irrigation
company built a dam ·and started to store from its direct
flow right, and thus affooted the mill right in volume
and time.
The Trial Court took the position that the rights of
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the parties were settled by the former decree, determining priority. The Supreme Court said that was error,
that the case presented· a new and different question,
and reversed it. In a good statement, ·as to appropriations, the opinion hy Judge Gabbert said:
''The appropriation of water for a specific
purpose qualified such appropriation by limiting
the volume to the quantity necessary for that
pur!pose. Ortma;n v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 33; Kin. Irr.,
Sec. 231; McKinney v. Smith., 21 Cal. 374. An
appropriator of water from a stre·am already
partly appropriated acquires a right to the surplus or residuum he appropriates; and those in
whom prior rights in the same stream are vested
cannot extend or enlarge their use of water to his
prejudice, but are limited to their rights as they
existed when he acquired his (Procbovr v. Jertr
nings, 6 Nev. 83; Cache La Poud~re Rese.rvoir Oo.
v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 53 Pac. 331, 25
Colo ....... ; Kin. Irr., Sees. 230, 232; Water Co. v.
Pow·ell, 34 Cal. 109), because, in such case, each,
with respect to his particular appropriation, is
prior in time and exclusive in right (Water Co.
v. Powell, supra)."
And, on the question of storage, it said:
''The right of diversion by the irrigation
company for storage purposes did not unqualifiedly at~ch under the decree by virtue of which
it claimed this right. ·This decree did not contemplate or provide for such a use. By such diversion, the irrigation company, in effect, sought to
make another appropriation for another purpose,
or, if not another appropriation, another use,
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which 1nay have resulted in the diversion , of
water in excess of that awarded its ditch, or at
a tin1e when the water thus taken was not needed
for the use for which it was originally ruptp·ropriated; and although it could change its use from
that for which it was originally appropriated,
and for which it was decreed, to another, it could
not exercise this right in such manner as to infringe on the rights of the plaintiff. * * *

•' • * * if the evidence established that no
appropriation had been made by the irrigation
company for the express purpose of storage,
which antedated the priority of plaintiff, then,
although the right of the irrigation company,
under the decree, to divert water for the purpose
of irrigation, may have been 1prior to that of
plaintiff, and by that decree· its right for that
purpose conclusively settled, it could not thereby
exercise that right, to the detriment of the latter,
by an enlarged or another use, measu1J1ed1 by either
volume or time, which would result in depriving
plaintiff of its appropriation. * * *

'' * * * or, otherwise expressed, if the rights
of the parties alone depended upon the decree,
then, although the irrigation company could
change the use of its appropriation from irrigation to that of storage, it could not divert water
for that punpose, which would result in a diversion measured by either volume or time, to the
damage of plaintiff, * * *.''
New LoveZand, Etc., Irr. Co. v. Con. Home Swpply,

Et.c., Co. (Colo.), 62 P. 366. This case relates to the
storage of direct flow waters~ but will probably serve
here only to point up that the rights for such direct
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irrigation and for storage are separate and distinct
rights.
The plaintiff, having a priority of 1883, started the
reservoir in 1893 for the purpose of storing in the "nonirrigating season'' waters which would otherwis,e run
through its ditch to waste. Defendant's right was subsequent and inferior to the irrigation right of p~aintiff,
but it started its reservoir for storage in the non-irrigating season during,· or prior to, 1889. Both completed
their reservoirs, and plaintiff claimed the right of prior
storage, by reason of its !priority of appropriation. The
Trial Court awarded the storage priorities in the order
of the initiation of the storage facilities, and the Supreme
Court sustained the judgment.

Finiey v. New Cache La Foudre Irr. Oo. (Colo.), 98
P. 173, is a later 'case than that cited by :Mr. Ethell, and
which is much more in point here. This was an action
to establish relativ,e priorities of a number of reservoirs,
and the question arose be-cause one party, having lower
storage rights, similar to the storage rights of respondents in Utah Lake, objected to those having upper
direct irrigation rights, storing the water for later use.
This was, even though they appeared to store the same
amount of water at the same time they would have used
it for irrigation, but did so in order to get a better head
or greater flow, or use the same a few days later. This,
the Trial Court held, they would not be permitted to do,
and the Supreme Court sustained the Trial Court, and,
in its opinion, said:
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'• As we g-ather frmn the record before us,
in1perfeet and indefinite thoug-h it is, it seems
that appellants are stoc.kholders in 1nutual ditch
eompanies which have 1nade ruppropriations of
water from natural streams for immediate irrig-ation and, in appropriate proc.eeding-s, have ohtained decrees therefor. On or near the lateral
ditc.hes of appellants are natural depressions, into
which, when water has been turned by the water
con1missioner into the main canal during the irrigating season, they have heretofore been acc.ustomed at impound their pro-rata share in order
to collect a sufficient head, or there to store temporarily water to be used a few days later in
irrigatin2,· their lands. In this statutory proceeding, the object of which was to adjudic.ate the
relative rights of the various reservoirs for storing water at times when the same was not needed
at onc.e for irrigation, appellants, solely in virtue
of their rights as stoc.kholders in these ditc.h
c.ompanies, seek to obtain priorities for their
reservoirs as against other reservoirs whic.h have
made approlpriations for storag-e purposes entirely distinct and separate from appropriations for
irrigation, and to fill such reservoirs with the
ditch water when it is turned out to them for
irrigation in the summer season. In other words,
appellants seek to convert their appropriation
for immediate irrigation into one for storage pur- .
poses, and to get for the latter a priority which
belongs to them only for the former purpose."

Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co.
(Colo.), 98 P. 729. This case involved the relativ;e priorities of a number ·of rights to store water in reservoirs
in one irrigation district.
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The particular point of decision that is applicable
here (p. 7'33, par. 3) arises on a provision ·in the decree
of the Lower Court that some of the reservoir com-:
panies might fill their reservoirs twice, provided ''that
said second filling shall in no manner aff·ect, prejudice
or injure the rights of junior reservoir appropriators."
This point is of some importance here because, we
think, it will appear from the subsequent dis~ussion that
the refilling of the propos·ed res-ervoir of respondents,
in whole, or at least in part, cannot and will not be
prevented or avoided; and, secondly, because of the contention of respondents here that the simpl~e pro:vision
in an order granting an application that it shall be "subject to prior rights'' is a sufficient protection.
In this Colorado case, it was contended that, because
the statute contained no provision prohibiting a refilling,
the decree should be sustained. ·The Appellate Court ·
held otherwise, and said:
''A double filling, in effect, would give two
priori ti·es of the same date and of the same capacity to the s·ame reservoir, on the same single
apipropriation, which is impossible in fact, and in
law, and, if allowed, would violate the fundamental doctrine of the law of appropriation * * •
A reservoir appropriation, like that of a canal,
cannot be made to do double duty.''

Williams, et al. v. Altrn.ow, et al. (Or.), 95 P. 200.
This is the case which Mr. Ethell, in his Article, indicated was against the right to such storage as is here
sought. Hi's conclusion is correct, in this respect.
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The ease involYed the storage and claim of right
of storage by an upper direct flow user to withhold su,ch
flow for later use. The difference between this and the
Colorado cas,e, which ~lr. Ethell said resulted in a contrary holding, is that, in the Colorado case, no drainage
rights below appeared to have been affected. It was
withholding of newly acquired rights, on a river system,
which would not affect lower us,ers, dependent upon
drainage.
This Oregon case, in this respect, is more in point
here, on the principle decided, although not identiCJal,
in fact. The def,endant Altnow, hy ·dam (p. 207), ~ut
off the direct flow of water for about 10 or 15 days, while
the reservoir was being filled, and at which time the
plaintiffs had the right to the use of water.
The water, or at least some of it, had been previously used for irrigation on the East side of the
Stream., and the drainage, as the water was used by
direct flow, was, of course, from this use. By placing
a dam higher up, he was able to divert wat,er to the
West side of the Stream, on his higher lands. Thus, the
former drainage would, necessarily, be affe-cted.
The defendant was, therefore, enjoined from storing
and using water from the reservoir on the higher lands,
West of the Creek.
It seems plain that the decision here, as based on
the finding (R. 116) of waste of water from Utah Lake,
or on alleged waste by Utah Lake users, is erroneous.
And, furthermore, we have found no case deciding
that water 1nay be withheld on a direct flow right for
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later distribution and use, where lower vested rights
depend upon the drainage from the direct use.
Note 70 A.L.B. 220, and the case preceding it, deal
with the question of detention or retardation of water,
in connection with riparian rights. The principles applied a;ppear to be about the same. It is held that a
riparial)- user, for power or for riparian irrigation, may
retard the water only to raise the head sufficient for his
own diversion or use, and may not so delay it for later
use, if such affects other users. It is pointed out (p.
238) that, in this connection, evaporation and absorption
are frequently of importance, and it is said (p. 239) that
"the amount of evaporation caused by the spreading out
of the water is certainly an important fact, and, taken
in connection with the size of the stream, may, in some
cases, be a controlling fact.''
POINT II.

The record disclose»; that the proposed plaw for
d,iversion and sto,rage would interfere with t.he rights
of lower users both as to volume and as to time of use.
{The evidence dJoes wot suppo.rt the findings.)
The section dealing with change application is
100-3-3. This

s,e~tion

provides, as to applications for

permanent change, that such application ''shall not be
rejected for the sole reason that such change would
impair vested rights of others, but, if otherwise proper,
they may be approved as to part of the water involved,
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or upon condition that such conflicting rights be acquired.''
We call attention particularly to this provision
because we have nothing here, either in the application
or in the decree, dealing with ''part of the involved
water," or dealing with any condition that conflicting
"rights be acquired." If, therefore, the rights of a:p'Pellants would be in any way interfered with by this operation, the application should be rejected, in accordance
with the previous provision of this section that ''no
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested right
u·ithout just compervsation. ''
As pointed out by the opinion of Judge Wolfe (Moyle
v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) at 895 ), the Engineer has
discretionary power in the granting of this character of
application for a permanent change, and there 1s no
vested right to such .change. This opinion says:
'' * * * the right to change the place of diversion is not an absolute or vested right, but is only
a conditional or qualified one. * * *
"It should be noted that in case of an application for a permanent change a.s com;pared to
a temporary change the procedure shall be the
same as is provided for in applications to appropriate water. * * * The right of the applicant
is not absolute. The Engineer is required to
determine certain facts some of which involve
the element of judgment. In the case of an application for a temporary change of use the Engineer 'Sh,all make an order authorizing a change'
'If such tempo.r:a.ry change does not impair any
vested rights of others.' The Shurtleff case was
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evidently based largely on the conception of a
vested right either complete or inchoate as ap. .
pears from the quoted portion of that case set
out above. But the word' shall' is used in Section
100-3-3 only in connection with an application for
a tempor:ary change of place of diversion or place
or purpose of use.''
Nor does the right or lack of right to such change
depend upon the quantity of water involved or the extent
of the injury. The statute does not limit the right to
object to such change because of these.
Respondents' only expert witness based his opinion
that this proposed operation could be feasibly carried
on without substantial injury to appellants on a premise
that the amount of water involved was so small.
As we have pointed out SU[Jffia, if the judgment of
the District Court in this case can be sustained here,
it n1ust be sustained in every similar case, and the result
of this could be devastating as to Utah Lake users,
and in other similar situations. There are scores of
such streams draining to the Lake. And there is no
basis for deciding these cases upon the theory that
single applications of this kind may not involve an
amount of water wh~ch, by itself, would cause great
injury. The application approval cannot be sustained
here under the statute,.'' if it impairs ·OJYIIY vested right.''
It appears, by the ~testimony of all three expert witnesses here that, if this 35 cfs. of water goes down, as it
has always done, in the high water season when the
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tially all of it will reach the Lal\:e; and that it will do
this after any waters would be spilled from Utah Lake,
and, also, before the irrigation season withdrawals therefronl. The right to have it at this time is important.
This condition is plainly true in averag·e high water
years such as 1938, and the foregoing 1neasurements show
that this year was not exceptional.
On the other hand, it is the testin1ony of each of
the said expert witnesses that, if. this water is held
and released in the later, hotter, and drier months of
from July to October, at least half of it would be lost by evaporation and transpiration. Witness Richards,
for respondent~, so testified (T. 134-135). Witness
George Earl, for app~:·Uants, so testified (T. 333-339,
359). And witness Garr\ner, also for appellants, so testified (T. 210, 213-214). There is no contrary testimony.
It is also testified, as recited above, that, as the
Lake water is drawn down by the pumping in this later
irrigation season from July to October, there is a large
area, amounting to a mile, or more, of the dry bed of
the Lake exposed, so that any water running into the
Lake does not reach the body of water so as to becon1e
available to the pumps, but is substantially lost. It is
for this reason that another pumping station was established on the West side of the Lake, a considerable distance below the intake of the Jordan River, and a canal
has been constructed, and is used to carry the water
from this Pelican Point pumping plant to the River (T.
308-309). This plant is for the purpose of draining out
the lowest part of the Lake.
1
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It thus seems obvious that existing rights on the
Lake would be injured, both as to supply and as to time.
This seems to he a matter of which this Court may take
judicial notice.

Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Vickers, 29 Utah 315, 81
P. 144. There, the defendant was entitled, by his appropriation, to all the water of a creek for 10-day periods
each month. The Court awarded him about one-third
of the water every day of the month. It was held that
the loss through evaporation and seepage of 1 cfs. of
water running through a ditch is almost as great as if
3 cfs. were running down. And, that the loss over a
10-day period is much less than would be the loss from
a smaller amount of water flowing over the longer period.
The opinion says :
''Evidently the evaporation and seepage of
such a small stream would be such as in great
part to destroy its efficiency and usefulness. Any
one who is at all acquainted with the properties
of water knows that the loss in such a stream by
evaporation and seepage is proportionately much
greater than in a stream two or three times its
size. In fact, it would seem too clear to require
demonstration by actual test that such loss would
in the same time be practically as great from the
smaller stream, flowing in the same ditch, as that
from the larger one.''
This water, released in this later irrigation season,
and since the waters are used and re-used would obviously he substantially exhausted.
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The right of appellants, both as to "quantity and
tiine,'' would be interfered with. ."\s stated in the Cobo.rado ]filling amd Ele~cator• case (56 P. at 187), supra,
respondents could make no chang-e of their appropriation to that of storage, which, as to appeHants, would
result in a •' diversion measured by either volttm.e or
tim e.·'
It is claimed by respondents here that the portion
of the "~ater which did reach the Lake in the later season
would at least to some degree, become available to the
Lake, even though not utilized until the following season.
This, of course, subject to losses from the dry Lake bed,
might be, to son1e extent, true. But, under the law,
the users on the Lake are entitled to have all the water
available there at the time that it would be available,
if allowed to flow in natural course, under est,ablished
uses. Respondents cannot be made the judges as to how
or when these peaple, within their rig-hts, may use the
water they are entitled to use.
Furthermore, it is clear that, in a great 1nany years,
it is vital to the primary rig-hts and the adjudicated
canal rights on the Lake that this water reach the Lake
during the current irrigation season. This is particularly
important to them in a low year, because such a year
may often be, and is, followed by a hig-h water year
on the Lake, when water mig-ht be required to be spilled;
in which case, late water, which may have added to the
storage for the next year, would add nothing to the
amount of like water available to them in such latter
year.
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This situati'Dn becomes clearer, as applied to the
Copper Company (T. 368) here, and to all like secondary
users, because these rights can only take water when
the primary and the adjudicated canal rights are being
fully met, and if these waters, which may have been us·ed
in the previous irrigation years, are put in storage
late in the Fall ~and then water is spilled in February,
or into March, this late water is lost to these secondary
users entirely, because the prior rights could cover and
use all available water.
We point out, also, that under the change application here, the water withheld in any calendar year need
not be released in that year at all. There is no such
limitation :provided in, or contemplated by, the application.
Also, it was contended in argument below that the
flow to the Lake from this later seasonal use might
be accelerated by the use of the water to irrigate small
areas of the whole 16,000 acres on which the petition
recites the direct flow water has been used, and on which,
it recites, this withheld water will be used. It is not
indicated how the Engineer would know whose land
would get it.
There, again, there is no such provision or limitation
in the application. The Lower Court simply directed
the Engineer to approve the application, and pro~eed
under it. So it, or what may 'Dr must he done under it,
is not qualified, at all.
This, and some of the other things referred to under
this topic, enter also into the next point of discussion.
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In conclusion of this point, it seems clear on the
record that this water could not be withheld from the
way it is wont to flow to the Lake in the wet 8ipring
season, either directly or by run-off from some use on
saturated land, without thereby interfering with existing rights, including the rights of appellants.
POINT III.
The pr1oposed ·plarn of dit·ersion, sto'f'lage, arnd distribution (1) ca.n'nol be so administered as to ilns11ffe that
the rights of lower users will not be injuriously affec-ted,
and (2) the State Engiweer' s determ.i11Ja.tion that it cannot be adrninistered so as to ·avoid such injury is controlling, and ( 3) his statutory duty of admirnristration
cannot arbitr;arily be ,controlled by the Trial Cowrt.
(The d.ecree is 'YIJOt supported by evidence or findings,
and is agaimst law.)

The history of irrigation law has shown a gradual
change from control by the Courts to control and administration by qualified State Engineers. Samuel C. W eil
(author of '' W eil on Water Rights''), in discussing 50
years of water law in an Article, Harvard Law Rev. 50:
252-304, described this change, and it would seem now
to be common knowledge.
As applicable here, he also points out the necessity
of the use of return flow of water for irrigation, and
that public policy requires the greatest possible number
of re-uses of water. In this connection, it would also
seem to be common knowledge that irrigation would be
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very substantially restricted if re-use rights could not
be firmly established, and then protected. This is the
purpose and intent of our statutory plan of administration.
Dealing with the claim of respondents that they have
the right to and can administer this water, as was largely
done when waters were regulated by Court decrees
alone, this author points out that such administration
had all the infirmities of ''human conduct, imperfect
wisdom, defective construction, and lack of good will
* * *." This autho-r also there points out that, even under
''impersonal'' control, there are still uncertainties due
to vagaries of rainfall, snow melting, evaporation, and
other factors of run-off and of stream flow.
In 1903, the Legislature of Utah commenced transferring the control and distribution of waters in this
State to the State Engineer, and has progressively
passed additional legislation increasing this control and
covering all the waters of the State, including, in more
recent years, the underground waters. We refer to some
of these Statutes :

''Administration amd Distribution''-St~ate Erngineer:
100-2-1:

He shall have had not "less than five years
experience as a practical engineer * * *,'' and
''such theoretical knowledge and practical experience and skill as shall fit him for the
position."
''He shall have general administrative supervision of the waters of the State, and the
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measurernent, appropriation, apportionrnent,
and distribution thereof.''
100-2-9:

He has been given the power of arrest of anybody interfering with his administration, and

100-1-15: n1akes it a misdemeanor for anyone to so interfere.
100-4-11: This section provides thrut, during a ''general
adjudication'' or determination of water rights,
the Engineer shall distribute the water according to the then existing decrees. (These waters
are in the course of such general adjudication
now.)
100-5-1:

By this section, the State Engineer a;ppoints
all Water Commissioners ''for the distribution of water from any river system or water
source." (Caldwell v. Erickson, 213 P. 182
(1923), held he had succeeded to right of appointment of Commissioners to administer
Court decrees.)

''The State Engineer and his duly authorized
assistants shaH carry into effect the judgments
of the courts in relation to the division, distri~
bution, or use of water under the provisions
of this title." It further provides that he shall
divide, or cause to be divided, the water wiithin
any district created under the provisions of
of this title, and shall regulate and control the
same.
100-5-5: Provides fror his supervision over the construe-

100-5-3:
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tion and repair of dams impounding more than
100 acre feet of water.
100-5-6:

Provides for his examination of any dam or
diverting works, either on his own initiative
or upon request of interested parties.

100-5-7 : Provides for his authotity to inspect di!tches
or any other diverting works, and to make requirement of changes or alterations.
100-5-11: Provides that he may make such requirements
as will prevent waste.
Change of Use:

100-3-3:

Deals with applications for change. Such application should state ''the place, purpose, and
externt of the present use, and the place, purpose, and extent of the proposed use." It recites: ''The procedure in the State Engineer's
Office, and the rights and duties of the applicant, with respect to applications for permanent
changes of point of diversion, place or purpose
of use, should be the same as provided in this
title for applications to appropriate water.''

100-3-8:

Is the section dealing with the approval or
rejection of applications, either for appropriation or cro(Jll1)ge. It says:

''It shall be the duty of the ·state engineer, upon the payment of the approval fee, to approve an
application if: * * * ( 2) The proposed use will not
impair existing rights, or interfere with the more
beneficial use of the water; (3) The proposed plan
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~; and
( -!:) The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works and the application was
filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly; * * * If an application doe-s
not meet the requirements of this section, it shall
be rejecte,d.''

i. . . physically a:nd econom.icall.tJ feasible • ""

100-3-10: Provides for the endorsement of a;pprova.l or
rejection on the application; and, if approved,
that the State Engineer shall require that actual construction work must begin within six
months.
100-3-17: Provides for a certificate, upon completion of
an appropriation or permanent change of
nature of use. It says: ''The certificate shall
oot extend the rights described in the a.pplica~
tion. ''
In this case, after the hearings before the State
Engineer, he wrote respondents a preliminary letter (R.
45 ), suggesting the ;possibility of a compromise arrangement here (100-2-16). He pointed out that the application had been changed to insure that no winter waters
would be stored and that: ''The evidence presented at
the hearing, together with the general information available in the office of the State Engineer, detnonstrates that
the proposed change could interfere substantially with
the vested rights of others.'' And, also, points out that
an ''applicant may not enlarge his basic right by the filing of a change application.''
There had heen some discussions as to the possibility
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of respondents' giving up some water for substitution
by direct flow to ·compensate for the proposed withholding and loss. The Engineer, therefore, granted time and
suggested that the matter o.f attemping to reach a stipulation with the owners of the Utah Lake rights be considered.
This ~Toposal was promptly rejected (R. 48), and the
State Engineer then rendered his decision which, on the
point under discussion, states the position of the appellants that the proposed change could not he made so as to
assure that established rights would not be interfered
with, we quote (R. 54):
''In part it was contended that the proposed
change would decrease the contribution from this
source of supply to Utah Lake. That it would (a)
change :the time at which the waters would reach
the Lake; (b) increase the amount of water lost
by transpiration and evaporation; and (c) permit
the applicant to store waters which it would not
have used by direCJt flow diversion * * *
''The evidence presented at the hearing, together with the general information available in
the office of the State Engineer, den1onstrates
that the proposed change could interfere substantially with the vested rights of others.
"Whether or not there will be interference
with rights already established, whether they be
junior or senior, depends largely upon the manner
in which the storage is administered by a public
official acting as Commissioner. In all storages
like unto the one involved here, i.e., rights in
Utah Lake, are made up in many instances by the
difference between that which can be diverted and
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
used and the supply. A direct flow user can only
use that portion to which his right entitles him
subject to the vagaries of weather, conditions of
crops, etc.
••The approval of the application granting the
right to store the water represented by flow
rights would impose upon an administrator the
obligation of determining, as mentioned hereinbefore, when weather condi'tions on the ground
would or would not permit the use of waters by
direct diversion in ap'plying it to a beneficial use
and then when the applicant could or could not, by
reason of other conditions, use the water in whole
or in part by direct diversion * * * This determination fron1 day to day and from thne to time
would impose a practical impossibility upon an
administrator * * * it is the State Engineer's duty
to reject the application, if it is impractical of operation to the end that others would be adversely
affected thereby, as outlined above.''
The respondents' contention on this, as adopted in
the findings, are: First, that they own and have the
right to control and administer the waters of American
Fork Creek (R. 114). A Second contention which has
been adopted is, in effect, that the Engineer does not
have discretion to do anything except to grant this, or
any, application, and recite that it is ''subject to :prior
rights.'' It will be noticed that 100-3-17 provides that,
when a certificate is finally issued, it shall be ''subject
to prior rights."
The conclusion of the Trial Court was that the '' approval of the applieation'' would not infringe on vested
rights, perhaps because water sometimes spills to Jordan
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River. But, the ''affect'' of such approval, as pointed
out by the Engineer, is that it would infringe, and this
has to be considered by him.
The mere approval, of course, would not affect anybody; but the operation of the scheme will. One of the
statutory conditions is that •• the proposed p~am/' be
feasible~.

And, as pointed out in the statutes, the question is to
he determined from hearings and from investigations by
the State Engineer and information in his office, and
involves, as this Court has pointed out, matters ''of judgment.''
The contention of respondent is that they can control
and administer the water, and if they, themselves, do not
properly regulate it, any vested rights affected have their
remedy in the courts, because the approval is ''subject
to prior rights;'' that the Engineer is a mere functionary
to approve applications, and ·without discretion even as
to the problem of "administrative supervision'' with
which the statute (100-2-1) charges him.
It would seem plain that here there could be no such
remedy, even b:v any multiplicity of suits. And, it also
should be clear, that this theory, as to administration
and relief, is exactly contrary to the system of administration, distribution, and relief, as now set up in the
statutes.
It goes without saying that respondents could legally
store water only at such times as they would have the
right of immediate beneficial use thereof. Such right
would depend upon the then conditions of the ground,
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of the crops, and of the weather. The duties of the State
Engineer to supervise and prevent waste would r~quire
him to permit no use, and so, of course, no storage at any
other time. U nrequired use is the commonest way of
wasting water.
This reserToir site is practically inaccessible in the
'Yinter and early Spring, and would he covered in deep
snow. Ass1m1ing the dam headgate might be exposed in
late April, and could be reached at that time, or in May,
it could be closed only if water was then flowing to the
Creek, and if respondents then required thiAs water for
beneficial irrigation.
If so, and a storm came, as they will at this season,
and do, blanketing the irrigable area, or causing flash
floods in the lower canyon, the gate would have to be
immediately raised, because they could then neither use
nor store water. But, the gate would then be a day's
snow-shoe journey away, so that this reservoir would be
filling up for a time, and, as a practical matter, considerable lengths of time, with some water respondents may
be, and some they would not be, entitled to use. It would
be impossible to tell how much of each was thus accumulated.
It should be remembered, also, that, by this application, this scheme involves storing and, also, releasing
water from this ·reservoir for irrigation in the same
period of time, between April 1st and June 15th.
No one can set a gate in this reservoir so as to hold
back water at a rate of 35 cfs., or 15 cfs., or any other
rate. If it were set so as to permit a flow of, say, 15 cfs.
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through the gate, no one could then know how much was
being held hack.
This is not a case like the Rock;y Ford case, 104 Utah
202, 135 P. (2) 108, at 110, where the Court can fix the
amount of flow that one appropriator is entitled to as
against another, and say that, above a flow of '' 164 cfs., ''
the additional water may he stored. And, it cannot be
said that the total amount of 1,000 acre feet, here involved, could be measured in the reservoir, for the reason
that the gate has to be released from time to time for
irrigation during the storage period, as above stated; and
also, to keep the withholding within respondents' water
rights. A partial or entire refill could not be prevented
by the Engineer, and certainly would not he by respondents.
And, furthermore, if the gate were set so that 35
cfs. could be measured through it by gravity flow, then,
in the same position, and under pressure of a high head
of water on the gate, twice that much could well get
through. And this would he true if it were set for 15
cfs., or any other rate of flow release, as it may be.
Again, take a time when there is 300 cfs. down at the
point of distribution, and assume that there would be a
period in the high wate:r;· season when respondents would
be entitled to beneficially use this amount so they withhold at the rate of 35 cfs. in the reservoir and use 265
cfs., how can anyone determine how much of the 35 cfs.,
so withheld, would run off to the Lake promptly, if it had
not been so withheld~
There is no requirement in this application that the
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water of the reservoir be released in the later irrigation
season, or in later years, at the rate of 35 cfs.; but, even
if it were, it is obvious that the same portion would not
reach the Lake; and, if it were released and spread out
over 16,000 acres at a. rate of, say, 10 cfs. or 15 cfs., it
seems quite certain that little, if any, of it would reach
the Lake. Certainly, it could not he administered so any
of it would reach the Lake so as to be available for irrigation therefrom in the season in which it is withheld by
respondents.
There is no provision here, or any proposal, for substitution or replacement of water by respondents surrendering the same; and, if there were, it seems also that
it would be utterly impossible for the State Engineer to
measure the loss that would inevitably occur from the
storing and releasing of this water in the late season,
so as to be able to make it up in any way to appellants,
either in time or volume.
Even if we assume a situation in which, at a certain
time, there were 105 cfs. available to respondents, and
they were to withhold 35 cfs. and turn down directly to
the Lake 35 cfs., and use 35 cfs. on their land, even
that simple situation is not free from complications, because it is impossible to definitely determine how much
water would promptly reach the Lake, if the 105 cfs.
were run over the land in the early season. No one can
measure or determine the difference in Lake inflows
that this plan would make.
There are other complications and difficulties that
the State Engineer must encounter, even within this
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area of irrigation. For example (R. 112), each of these
respondents is entitled to a different portion of the water
in the withholding period of the applieation, from that in
the period in which the water would be released. Pleasant
Grove, for instanee (R. 112), in April, would be entitled
to one-fourth of the water; from July to September,
about one-fifth; and, in September, about one-fifteenth.
Similar variations oecur as to both American Fork and
Lehi, Lehi being entitled to one-sixth in April and to onethird from July to Septembe-r.
And, perhaps a more serious eomplication arises in
connection with those having right to use which are
secondary to those of the three respondents. These users'
rights (R. 35-36, 37, 81-83) have been supplied only during the high water supply, so that water withheld
in this period and released in smaller portions and with
a low supply of water would not be available to supply
the right of these users, at all.
There is always the problem, too, of maintaining
the even flow required by the stipulation wilth the Power
Company (R. 108).
There just isn't any practical or, for that matter,
any possible way of determining the extent of the affect,
of this proposed scheme upon Utah Lake rights. It should
be obvious that, if the operation of the plan is left to
respondents, as it cannot legally be left, they would operate it, of course, hut it would so operate that they would
get the whole amount of the water covered by this applicatron, additional to the right that they have already got.
They could get more by refilling. They would, thus, make
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this anwunt of water do double duty, contrary to law,
a~ well a~ injuring the Lake rights, contrary to law.
\Y e do not suggest that they need act dishonestly in
doing thi~. but they could not be expected to exercise the
diligence and pay the expense of even atten1pting the
impossible adjustn1ents hnposed here; and they would,
by a change application, get all the additional water this
reservoir can be made to supply.
The record shows ( T. 82) that once the Commissioner did ask, when the Pleasant Grove ditch was full
to capacity, that some be turned to the Lake. None was
turned. It should be noted that, no matter what the law
may say, these respondents think we have no rights, at
all, as to American Fork Creek.
After the respondents had put in their case on this
question of practicability or feasibility of administration,
and after the appellants had put in their case, respondents put their expert back on the stand to a~tempt to offer
something as to how this plan might be operated (T. 384395).

If this statement is carefully analyzed, it will be
found that it amounts to no more than a statement that,
if this was only a matter of holding back a quantity of
water by a group of users, according to their rights, and
the releasing of it to them later, by agreement as to how
it might be used, they might he able ·to operate it. This
is described as a common method. And, in connection
with it, Ex. "EE" was introduced.
It entirely ignores the affect on lower vested rights.
The expert's statement does not clear up any of the
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difficulties hereinabove, or by the Engineer, cited. In
order to escape the fact that water may also be released
in the period 'of storage, he has the water stored in
April; whereas it is alleged (R. 9), and contended
throughout, that the storage is to be in the high water
season. However, this witness calculates, and on this he
seems to be correct, that in May and June 65% of the
entire yearly flow comes down. That is when they want
to take it, and that is when we naturally get it.
He assumes releasing it in the month following the
storage, (July), although this is not required or contemplated by the application. Also, the use of it on a
small portion of the land, although this the Engineer
would not be permitted to do in administering this application. He talks of releasing it with a substantial amount
of additional water; whereas respondents allege that the
entire flow of American Fork Creek, in the season of
later release, does not exceed 30 cfs.-about 10 cfs. to
each respondent (R. 7). He assumes, throughout, that
the respondents, when the water was sufficient, would
be entitled to use all that their ditches would hold, regardless of the need of it for beneficial use, at the time,
and not withstanding this, admits that, even under the
situation which he passes upon, there would still be difficulties (T. 393).
Admittedly, the conclusions are based on many ''assumptions," but the Engineer has to go by the law and
the terms of this application.
Respondents sugg·est that we can go to Court, at any
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thing to their rights, or subtract anything from ours.
But how, and when, and by what possibility of proof,
as to definite violations, or the extent of eff.ect thereof,
or druuages therefrom Y
This is a situation such as our statutes, inliposing the
duties of distribution upon the Engineer, are now intended to prevent. How could we be at this reservoir
site, and at the point of distribution, at all times, to know
just what was being done, or to determine and prove how
much water was required for beneficial use 1 Or how
much more was used, or the damage to any user thereby1
The whole thing is not the right or function of either
the appellants or the respondents here. It is the statutory
duty of the State Engineer.
And, how Inany law suits would it tak~, by all the
different users on the Lake, and how could the extent of
the damage by any of the acts he determined, or the
liability for such acts fixed 1 It is not the policy of the
Courts, as we understand it, to promote such a multiplicity of litigation.

State Engineer's Discretion:
Can the Trial Court compel the State Engineer to
approve and put this kind of operation into effect, when
the statute places the entire duty and responsibility of
controlling and administering it upon him-or compel
the State Engineer to undertake such an administration
when he has reasona:bly determined that he cannot administer it s·o as to prevent violations of the statute, and
of the vested rights of water users 1
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This character of withholding, and these resulting
questrons, are novel in this State.
'The claim, however, as to the right of the respondents to, themselves, set up and operate the proposed plan,
is sufficiently and negatively answered by the statutes.
On the general question, we have cited the cases that
have been found, supra; and, in every case where there
were existing lower rights, dependent on run-off, it has
been held, as a matter of substantive law, that such withholding from a direct irrigation right is not permissible.

Weil on W,ater Rights, p. 556, referring to the Colorado cases, says :
''This, in Colorado, is sometimes phrased by
saying that a priority 'cannot he made to do
double duty,' meaning, apparently, that cumulative purposes of use, whereby the water is used
over again before discharge from control, cannot
he made to the injury of others. Having appropriated water only for actual irrigation in the irrigation season, it cannot he so used and also stored
in 'the non-irrigating season, which is said to make
the priority do 'double duty.' "
These cases, however, do not decide the question of
control by the Court of the Engineer's judgment and discretion on matters such as are here involved.
This precise question has not been directly decided
here, or in any Court, so far as as we know. Nor has the
question as to what weight shall be given to the Engineer's decision or judgment, as to what can be administratively done in this kind of situation. The statute
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quoted supra does indicate that, if he detennines that the
"plan" is not feasible, it is his duty to reject the application by which the plan is to be initiated.
His field of knowledge, in considering applications,
is, under the statute, much broader than the Court's
because he can rely upon his investigation and the accumulated information in h:ls office, as well as the evidence.
In general, such applications require, as has been
said supra, elements of judgment, and, in any application resembling the one here, it is necessarily required
that a judgment in advance be reached, as to what will
be the "effect" of the application. So, the statute requires that this judgment, on the part of the State Engineer, shall be by one having not only an expert Engineer's study and training, but, at least five years of
practical experience.
And, the character of application here involved
differs substantially from one to appropriate water, and
from the usual application to change the point of diversion. The effect of these have no foreseeable administrative problem.
As to the former, our Courts have held that the application shall be granted, if it is reasonably probable
that unappropriated waters may become available. This,
ordinarily, can do little hann, either way, because the
waters of the system are measured to the prior owners,
and, if none is left over, the applicant gets none, and no
harm is done. Ordinarily, no expensive investments are
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ments can usually pre-determine if water may actually
be available.
The question of expensive outlay, which may be
wholly lost to the water users, as presented here, makes
this situation different. And, in any event, it presents
a complicated adrninistrative problem, not generally involved. So that we have here presented a new and farreaching question.
In view of the new and increasing number of applications for such change of nature of use, by withholding
water used for immediate irrigation, this question becomes one of great importance to water users of the
State, and particularly to the State Engineer. Even the
expense to his office, of placing the required number of
Commissioners on these operatior;ts, alone, is a matter of
grave consequence to the Engineer. On the number of
applications of this character now pending, this would be
prohibitive. There are others on Utah Lake sources,
as well as several on the Sevier River drainage sources.
As stated above, this Court can take notice of these.
The Problem is One of F'tact, No·t of Law:

The point of conflict is whether the scheme of operation involved can feasibly, practicably, or possibly be
administered so as to protect existing rights. This administration, as the Engineer said, is the ''effect'' of
approval of the application, as now ordered.
The need of administrative supervision, and by
trained experts, is more apparent in this field than in
almost any of the other fields of state administration,
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and where the authorities have said that the Courts may
not control the discretion of executive officers; either (1)
in the determination of factual matters within their jurisdiction, or (2) in discharging their executive duties.
It seen1s to us that all of the arrangements, factors,
measurements. and considerations that enter into the
question of administration and distribution of waters are
n1atters of factual, and not legal, import. And, also, that
this question of possibility or impossibility of administration, is a practical one, and its determination is for the
expert administrative officer, and not for the Courts.
However, the Trial Court has, in effect, said that the
Engineer shall approve a plan, the effect of which would
be to require him to do what appears can't he done. And,
since it could legally he done only if the Engineer could
undertake and do it, it must be assumed that it won't be
done at all. And so, existing rights necessarily will be
changed, and interfered with.
No one would contend, we think, that a Court could
take over and direct any distribution job by the Engineer.
Nor do we see how it could rightly be done in this indirect
way.
If this were a typical case, as we have .pointed out,
where the Court were acting in judicial determination
of rights, and had, for example, said that "X" is entitled
to 25 cfs. from this source, and, when his right is being
supplied, the balance shall go to "Y," and shall he diverted at his new or changed point of diversion, the
right of the Court and the duty of the Engineer would 'be
clear.
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Or, even if the Court had found, as to the Engineer's
findings of non-feasibility or impracticability ·or impossibility, that the Engineer had acted capriciously,
in that he, if he would, could administer this operation,
by doing certain things, or doing it in some way, such
as the Court might think possrble, it would have either
settled the matter or have presented something for consideration here.
But the Trial Court merely entered conclusions (R.
116) ''That: The diversion and storage applied for
would be possible and feasible of administration from the
standpoint of use by plaintiffs, and from the standpoint
of the protection of the rights of the defendants and
other Utah Lake interests, and that the administration of
said change is practicable.'' (This, incidentally, follows
the finding thaJt large quantities of water have, at times,
been spilled from Utah Lake to Great Salt Lake.)
And then, the Court ordered that the Engineer reinstate the application, and proceed with the proposed
plan, without anything to inform, or guide, or enable him
to do so. So that, at most, there is only a difference of
opinion between the Oourt's conclusions, based on no
findings, and the decision of the Engineer, in which a
basis, at least, for his decision and his different conclusion is recited. This basis is not challenged by any
factual findings.
We think that, even if the respondents had offered,
and the Court had heard, any facts to contradict the
Engineer's findings, and had then made contrary ones,
this Court, under the law, would have sustained the
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Engineer's finding on this factual adn1inistrative question. ~-\nd, on the principles of law, cited infra, there is
greater reason for now doing so.
We do not question the proposition that the decision
of questions of law in a proceeding of this kind is for,
and within, the judicial powers of the Court, nor that
the determination of the finality of rights to the use of
waters belongs to the Courts. These matters have been
decided by this and other Courts rather frequently.
\Ye point out, however, that, while the right to the
use of water is a vested right, as quoted above (176 P. (2)
at 895), there is no vested right to the change here sought.
(See also, U. S. et al v. Caldwell, 231 P. 434, at 439.)

Garrison v. Davis, 88 Utah 358, 54 P. (2.) 439, at 443,
is a case in which this Court makes some reference to the
weight to be given to a recommendation by the State
Engineer. While this was a general adjudication suit,
in which the determination of water rights was directly
involved, this Oourt, with reference to the recommendations of the State Engineer, said:
''While it may be that the trial court was
not bound to accept such recommendation, still, in
the light of the fact that the State Engineer collected the information which formed the basis of
the decree, the recommendation of the State Engineer was entitled to gtreat weight."
The recommendation of the Stat8 Engineer was that
the Court retain a rather general jurisdiction for five
years. This was clearly within the Court's judicial
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field, while here, the Engineer's decision is in his administrative field.
The Court, there, in substantial disregard of this
recommendation, retained jurisdiction to ma:ke only
''minor corrections.'' The Trial Court had held that the
determination of a priority was not minor, and could be
considered, but this Court reversed that decision, and
was apparently influenced, to some extent at least, by
tthe ~onsidera:tions aborve quoted.
The foregoing case also held that this Court, in
deciding that matter, could examine and consider the
opinion of the State Engineer for his views. The Engineer's opinion here is before the Court, both by pleading
(R. 53) and as evidence (Ex. "12").
This review is pursuant to 100-3-15, which provides
that the hearing in the District Court shall ''proceed as a
trial de nova," and as a case in equity. This was urged
and apparently interpreted below as disposing of all the
questions now presented, including the power of the
Court to impose a new State administrative policy-in the
matter of withholding and distribution of water, and,
also, to pass upon the possibility or feasibility of the
administration, necessarily imposed by this policy; the
theory being that no separation of judicial or administrative functions is involved; and that, since the Engineer is required to simply grant such applications subject to prior rights, the whole problem is very simple.
The meaning and- scope of ''trial de nova,'' in this
water statute, has not heen directly defined by this Court.
The meaning, as used in the State Utility Acts, will be
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referred to later. The dictionary definition of ''de nova"
i~ "anew.'· and it would be reasonable to expect that a
trial in equity was intended to cover judicial examina~
tion of the issues of law and, also, to consider the facts;
at least, the determination of any existing factual conditions nece~sary in determining the legal questions involved.
The definitions of "de no,va," as used in statutes
( \Yords and Phrases), are not numerous, and they lead
to the conclusion that, on appeal from Justice's or inferior Courts, the term means a ''new trial,'' as if none
had been had before. In such appeals, there is, of course,
no question of investigation or determination by an adIninistrative official or board.
It also appears that the statutes have used the term
"trial de nova" in industrial compensation and similar
cases, where the review is on evidence before a quasi administrative board. It is usually held that it is intended
that the new trial be upon the same issues.
Our statute on the question of this character of review differs from the statutes of most of the other States,
in that it contains no stated provision as to what questions the Trial Court shall decide, and what the Court
may do with the Engineer's decision.
For example: The California statute on appeal and
review of the determination by the water board on application to appropriate water provides that the reviewing
Trial Court may enter a judgment ''affirming, modifying, or reversing" the board. (Deering Gen. Latws, 1931,
ACt 9091).
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It is important here to point out, also, as indicated
in the following cases, that this Court has held that the
reviewing Court may not set up its judgment and determination as to future procedure by the applicant, in
pursuing or perfecting an application to approtp~iate
water.
Whitmore v. Welsh, 201 P. (2) 954. In this case, and
on review of an application to appropriate, the Trial
Court, in deciding that the application should be granted,
made it subject to the condition that the rights of another
applicant, not directly involved in the suit, should be first
determined. The Court held that the insertion of this
condition in the judgment was ''unwarranted.''
Also, to make the point of return on the application
come above the contestant's point of diversion, the Engineer had imposed a change upstream from the point of
return recited in the application. On this, the Court said:
"The only condition which the State Engineer
had authority to attach to approval of the Welsh
application, was that the point of return be far
enough upstream from the Whitmore diversion
point to avoid a conflict. The District Court
oould impose rvo conditiorns other than those which
the St·ate Engineer had authority to impose."
This would tend to indicate that, if in the present
case the :State Engineer,/ in passing upon the administrative problem, had decided that the plan was possible of
administration, if certain conditions were imposed, this
might be within his province; and, if it were, the Court
could not impose other or different conditions.
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In Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. (2) 882, at 895, as
we have already pointed out, the opinion of Judge Wolfe
there says:
'• The right o.f the applicant is not absolute.
The Engineer is required to determine certain
facts, some of which involve the element of judgment."

Rocky Ford Irr. Oo. v. Kent Lakes Res. Co., 135 P.
(2) 108. Reference there is made (p. 113) that, on review
trial, the District Court found, on conflicting evidence,
that there was unappropriated water, and so based its
judgment that the application was rightly granted. The
Engineer had so found. This is an example of determination of fact, for the purpose of exercising the judicial
function.
This same case involved a transfer of reservoir storage, and it was contended that the Court should have
made some order with relation to the construction of the
proposed reservoir, and its sup€rvision, matters with
which the statutes charged the State Engineer. On this
contention, this Court said:
"The Court correctly refused to supervise or
limit the type of dam to be built at Three Creeks.''

E,ardley v. Terry, 77 P. (2) 362. This case contains
a more definite decision hy this Court as to the division
of the administrative and judicial functions. The Engineer had denied the application to appropriate water.
However, the duly appointed Water Commissioner, for
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his office, testified at the Trial to the general effect that
it was probable that public water had been or could be
developed. The Court, in accordance with previous decisions on this, therefore, held, as a matter of law, that
the application should have been granted.
The Court, however, went further, and recited that
the development had been without injury to the rights
of the protestants, or what was beneficially required by
them, and entered a decree allowing the applicant to
trench a;bove protestanJts' point of diversion, and without
injury to them, to develop water to which he should have
a right, thus entering the practical administrative field.
Such findings were eliminated hy this Court, on the
ground that the Trial Court could determine only the
question as to whether the application should he granted,
and that, in determining that question, ''the Court stands
in the same position as the State Engineer.'' That future
questions, leading possibly to a certification of a final
right, including the matters decided by the Court, and
which were stricken, were matters to be consiqered by
the State Engineer under the statute::; relating to these.
Directly on Sec. 100-3-14, and the "duty of. the Court
to try the case de nov·a,'' this Court said that this statute
did not stand alone, and was to he considered with the
other statuteis dealing with the matters involved. And, in
effect, that "trial de nova" did not permit the Court to
determine questions involving other statutes, giving
duties of determination to the State Engineer. This appears to have application here, under the statutory
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duties of the State Engineer as to administrative questions, which haYe been set out above.
Thus, we contend, the other statutes relating to the
administrative duties of the Engineer must be given effect, as to this application.

Tanner v. Humphreys, State Engineer, 48 P. (2) 484.
This case dealt wilth an application for change o.f place· o.f
diversion. This C<>urt held that the change could possibly
be made ''ithout injury to vested right, and sent the case
back to the Trial Court. At Page 488, it quotes from a
Colorado case, as follows :
"If the change is made, it disturbs the existing order and manner of distributing water
diverted from our natural streams into irrigating
ditches, 1rhich is performed by public offvcers, and
causes a modification to be made in the general
adjudication decree. It is fitting that a party who
asks such relief shall bear the burden of proving
that the vested rights of others will not thereby
be infringed if it is granted. It is only the burden
which is usually imposed upon the moving party
in a law suit."

Denver & R. G. W. RR. Co., et al v. Public Service
Commission et al., 100 P. (2) 552. We will discuss this
case here because, as mentioned above, it contains a discussion of trial de novo, and als·o introduces the question
as to what matters are for decision by the judicial department of Government, and what matters are for decision
by the administrative department of Government, under
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the separation of powers, as contained in the Constitution.
On the first rnatter, the case points out that, under
the authorities, a trial de nova may mean an entirely new
trial, without reference to a previous hearing, or a trial
upon the record, or some portions of the record, made
in the previous hearing. It held that, in the case of an
appeal from a determination of the Public Service Commission, granting or withholding a contract carrier's application, although the statutes said that the "hearing
in this District Court should proceed as a trial de nova,''
such trial should proceed upon the record of evidence, as
made in the Commission hearing. Judge \Volfe dissented, as to this.
The decision of the Court also pointed out that,
where the appeal was, by the statute, made to review the
decision, as under 100-3-14, in which the appeal is specifically referred to as "a review" of the Engineer's decision, it must be treated as having a "meaning consistent with the continued existen~e of that which is to
be again examined or studied.'' That it could not be
treated as if that proceeding no longer existed.
However, the questions that may be determined by
the judicial or by the executive departments of the State,
and the extent to which the Courts may control the executive branch, do not appear to depend upon the nature of
the review proceedings. That is a separate question here.
The close point is whether the Court can control the
dete,rmination of the practicability or possibility of administering a plan, the administration ·of which the legisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lative department in1posed upon the Engineer; and, also,
whether the Courts should attempt to exercise such control.
Judge 'Yolfe, in his dissenting opinion, discusses
(p. 556) this question of division of powers and of duties,
and cites a ntunber of authorities. 'Ve agree with this
discussion, as to overlapping duties which the increase
of '• administrative government'' has created. (See Tite

State Tax Comm., 57 P. (2) 734 for a full discussion of
this.) 'Ye agree, also, as to the clarity of our constitutional provision, and the in1portance of the use of the
words '• any interference,'' therein. We note, also, the
statement:
'r.

"But as has been many times reiterated by
the Courts : It is not the function of the Courts
to set aside an arrangement made by the Legislature, unless it is a clear and flagrant violation of
the principle of separation of powers.''
The opinion also approves the following quotation
from Willoughby on the C onstituti!on, Vol. 2, Sec. 743, as
follows:
''Generally speaking, it Inay be said that,
when a power is not peculiarly and distinctively
legislative, executive, or judicial, it is within the
authority of the Legislature to determine where
its exercise should be vested.''
The opinion of Judge Wolfe, in this case ( p. 560),
also cites an Article-19 .Minn. Law Rev. 261, by Ray A.
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Brown, Prof. of Law, U. of Wis.-on the matter of administrative officers and the Courts.
This writer, as do others, discusses the increase in
administrative government to meet developing situations,
but analyzes the matter mainly from the standpoint of
extent o.f encroachments thereby, of administrative acts
upon the former judicial functions.
There appear to 'be fewer discussions of the opposite
question, as to what extent the Courts, on review, may
control the executive officers, or boards, in the exercise
of their legislatively imposed administrative duties,
under the constitutional separation of .powers.
1

This author, in discussing the reasons for increased
delegation of governmental functions to executive officers, says (p. 262) :
''In many instances, the subject matter of" the
regulation required for its administration a specialized knowledge much more in the competence
of the particularly trained and experienced experts in the field than in that of the judges of our
customary courts, whose knowledge was· necessarily much more diffuse.''
And he also says ( p. 282) :
''In a large class of cases the non-judicial
determination of controversies is sustained on the
ground that the subject thereof is a matter of
privilege, and not of right.''
The determination by public officials of water rights
and priorities is referred to 'briefly (p. 298), and it is
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pointed out that the statutes on this provide for Court
review in various ways.
The exact question, as we have it here, a.s ~o what
may be reviewed, or on what matters the Court may reverse an executive officer's determination is not analyzed. Fron1 the authorities that we have cited, and the
articles exan1ined, however, these thing·s appear to be
established :
1. The duty to control and administer the distribution of the waters of the State involves the expert determination of the questions of practicability, possibility,
or feasibility under the different circumstances arising.
2. That these are such administrative duties as
may, by the legislative department, be imposed upon an
official of the executive department, and that this has
been done.
3. It follows that, standing alone, such duties may
be legally exercised by the Engineer, without the necessity of providing for any Court review. And, if they be. come involved in such review, under the general provisions therefor, the Court cannot, or certainly should
not, assume to change such determinations to the judicial
field of decision. That judicial interference or reversal,
based on this question, is not justified.
,
4. It also appears here that, if the reversal by the
Trial Court was not solely on the basis of finding that
surplus water had, at times, spilled from Utah Lake, then
it had to be on the basis of disagreement between the
Court and the Engineer, as to this administrative matter.
We believe the authorities, above cited, establish that
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the Court could not substitute its views for those of the
Engineer, on this.
Admittedly, the determination of .priority of water
rights is for the Courts, but this is not involved, nor is
there any question of fraud or abuse of discretion involved here. On the other hand, a ~hange of nature of use
is not an unconditional right it is a privilege, which could
here be justified only if the discharge of many complicated administrative pr9blems and difficulties would prevent interference with other rights. Such matters, as
these, have, by the Legislature, been delegated to the
Engineer.
It would be impracticable to review all the decisions
of this Court which discuss the effect or weight to be
given to determinations of questions by administrative
officers or boards, to which the Legislature has committed some measure of determination. Some of these are
annotated under Sec. 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, an~
others, under the various sections defining the powers
of the various boards and officers.
As we have pointed out above, the State Engineer is
required to he an expert. We have in mind one other executive officer in the State of Utah who is required to
be an expert in order to be entitled to be appointed. We
refer to the State Bank Commissioner. He is required
(7-1-1) to have at least four years experience in banking;
and in dealing with functions to which he is appointed,
and to acts which he could do only "with the approval"
of the District Court. 'This Court has said:
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"In the exercise of such power, the Court
howeYer, 1nay not, as in case of receiver or other
officer subject to its orders and direction, set
up his 1nere judgrnent against that of the Bank
Conunissioner * * *'' (8t. Bank, of Milbard Co. v.
Hadlock, 30 P. (2) 211, 215).
And, this Court also said, in the matter of fixing
compensation of examiners in liquidation, subject to approval of the Court, that the Bank Commissioner ''is not
a mere factotem," and "the Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Bank Commissioner." (In Re
Provo Com. Bk., 81 P. (2) 644, 647.)
And, in a matter of liquidation, this Court said it
would presume that the Commissioner will liquidate it
according to law. (Lustig v. Intermt. Bldg. Assn., 123 P.
(2) 707, 709.)
This Court has pointed out that the similar procedures for judicial review of orders of the Securities Commission (82-1-41), and the Department of Registration
(79-1-36), are to the effect that aggrieved parties may
institute actions in the District Court for review. And
has said, as to these, that the Court ''shall determine as
on an appeal in equity, whether the findings * * * are
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence,''
and not as on a review of a determination by the Industrial Commission, whether there is ''any substantial evidence to support such findings." (Gibbs v. Manson, 129
P. (2) 887, 890.)

Again, in a matter involving an order of the Public
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Service Commission, denying an application for truck
company's certificate, the Court said:
''It has 'been repeatedly held that a review of
the Commission's order is limited to a determination of whether the Commission acted within the
scope of its authority, whether the order has any
substantial foundation in the evidence, and
whether any substantial right has been infringed
by such order." (Mulchary v. Commission, 117 P.
[2] 298, 299.)
This Court has also said, in dealing with the Industrial Commission, but not on a matter of the amount
of compensation, in which matter the statute limits the
Court, but in the determination of the question of the
cause of death, that a question of law was presented,
when it is found that the Commission could only arrive
at one conclusion from the evidence, and that it found
contrary to that inevitable conclusion. That a conflict of
evidence was for the Commission to resolve, and that
''great respect will be accorded the findings of the Commission in that regard." (Norris v. Commission. 61 P.
[2] 413, 416.)
Most of the foregoing cases point out that matters,
pertaining to legal rights or any other purely judicial
questions, are for the Cou:rtts ; and the Court in dealing
with the Securities Commission and its determination as
to the registration of securities, said:
''The Commission is not a Court, although
exercising quasi-judicial functions, but is an administrative board, exercising on behalf of the
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State the regulatory powers authorized ·by the
Act." (In Re Deseret Mortuary Co., 3 P. [2] 267,
270).
This a:bout indicates the situation of the State Engineer, in relation to the administrative functions involved.
A determination of the problem calls for a more
extended consideration of the law, as to the division of
powers between the departments of Government.
Art. Y, Sec. 1, of the State Constitution, says:
''The powers of the Government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the J udicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers :properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.''
Discussing this question, 42Am. Jur. contains the following statements under "Public Administrative Law,"
which are applicable:
Page 564:
''Sec. 191. JUDICIAL AND NON JUDICIAL POWERS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED. In determining whether a statute
providing for judicial review of administrative
determinations contravenes the principles of separation of powers, it is necessary to distinguish
between judicial functions which can, and nonjudicial functions which cannot, be conferred upon a
court vested with judicial powers only. The controlling question is whether the function to be
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exercised by the court is a judicial one, and if it
is, its c.hJat"~aC'ter is wo·t affected by the fact that the
proceeding is an aprpeal frrorn am administrative
body, as distinguished from a suit for an injunCtion to set aside or restrain enforcement of the
determination, nor by the fact that the administrative determination itself is of a legislative
character, nor by the fact that the proceeding
is not de novro. * * *
'' * * * A statute which provides or permits a
court to revise the discretion of a commission in
a legislative matter by considering the evidence
and full record of the case, and entering the order
it deems the commission ought to have made, is
invalid as an attempt to confer legislative powers
upon the co11Jrts. A statute conferring a power to
review nonjudicial determinations of an administrative body is not valid where the reviewing
power is limited to questions of law which are the
appopriate subject of judicial determination,
particularly where the review provided is not die
novo but is in the nature of certiora.ri and limited
by the record made before the administrative
body. Thus, statutes reposing a .power of review
in courts are valid where the review is limited to
matters such as whether the administrative
authority has acted within the limits of its authority and proceeded according to law, or has violated any rights secured by the Federal or a state
Constitution, or whether or not the administrative determination is supported by evidence, or is
arbitrary."
Page 601:
''Sec. 206. GENERALLY. In situations in
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tive- action is available, the problen1 of the scope
and extent of the judicial review arises and present~ the questions as to what matters are open
to review and what inquiry the courts will make
in reviewing particular matters. It is with this
problem that this subdivision of the article deals
• • • Generally, judicial review of administrative
orders is limited to determining whether errors of
law have been con1mitted. In many cases, however, particular factors are present which may
vary the scope of review in smne instances from
that accorded under the general standards. Both
the judicial and the statutory standards as to the
scope of judicial review leave with the courts considerable opportunity for choice and self-restraint
in appl3ing the standards to specific cases. The
standards are not objective, but require the exercise of judgment in a field where differences of
opinion are common and frequently reasonable* * *
''In creating administrative agencies and endowing them with certain powers, the legislative
usually prescribes a certain policy to be administered by the administrative authority.''
Page 602:
"Sec. 207. PARTICULAR FACTORS AFFECTING SCOPE OF REVIEW. In attempting to determine the scope and extent of judicial
review of administrative action, certain guides in
the language of the courts are met with grea;t frequency and in a multitude of different applications, and these guides may be termed the general
standards of review. * * *
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acteristics of the particular remedy 'by which review is sought, so· that if one remedy rather than
- -. another is chosen, the power of the court to inquire into the determination will hH different; or
it may depend, at least in part, upon the particulwr
nature oif the function; exercised, by the administrative tribunal, whether judicial, legislative, administrative, or executive, however vague the distinctions between such function, * * *
Page 605:
''8ec. 208. FACT 0 R S RESTRICTING
SCOPE OF REVIEW. Various factors may narrow the scope and extent of judicial review of administrative action and, conversely, broaden the
area in which the exercise of administrative discretion is immune from judicial control. * * *
''The nature of a controversy as involving a
matter of privilege as distinguished from a matter
of right may also tend to narrow the scope and
extent of judicial review and to extend the area
of administrwtive 'discretion, as where an administrative agency adopts rules and regulations with
respect to the enforcement of the liquor laws,
or refuse-s to grant, or revokes, a license, :or refuses to admit aliens into this country. The power
bestowed upon the Secretary of ·the Treasury to
remit penalties under the revenue laws is not a
judicial one, but one of mercy to mitigate the
severity of' the law. The exercise of the power
is -a matter of his discretion alone, from which
there· can be no -appeal.''
Page 610:
"Sec. 209. GENERALLY. In general, in
the absence of valid statutory provisions or other
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factors affecting tl1e scope and extent of judicial
review, adn1inistrative deter1uinations \vill not be
interfered with by the courts unless, but will be
interfered with where, the determination is beyond the powers whirh could constitutionally he
vested in or exercised by an administrative
authority; the determination if without or in excess of the statutory powers and jurisdiction of
the adJninistrative authority, the determination
is an exercise of power so arbitary or unreasonable as virtually to transcend the authority conferred, or is otherwise an abuse of discretion, or is
in disregard of the fundamental rules of due process of law, as required by constitutional or statutory directions, as where made without adequate
notire, fair hearing, and opportunity for the aggrieved party to present evidence, or in an otherwise irregular proceeding, or is tainted with
matters which disclose fraud, mistake, bad faith,
corruption, or collusion, or is based upon an error
of law.
'' * * * The court has nothing vo d1o with the
wisdom or expediency of the measures adopted
by an admitnistrative agency to which the formulation and execution of state policy has been intrusted, and must not substitute its judgment o.r
notions of expediency and fairness or wisdom for
tho·se which have guided. such agervcy, even where
the proof is convincing tha.t a different result
would have been better. These are matters left
by the legislature to the administrative 'tribwnal
appointed by law and ilnfotrmed by experience'."
Page 626:
"Sec. 211. QUESTIONS OF FACT. In the
absence of statutory directions to the contrary,
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and of any vital defect such as one with respect
to jurisdiction or procedure, and except as there
may be an exception for findings of facts bearing
upon constitutional or jurisdictional issues, it is
the general rule that administrative findings of
fact are conclusive upon a reviewing court, and
not within the scope of its reviewing powers, at
least if supported 'by evidence, or substantial evidence, or competent evidence, or if 'based upon
conflicting evidence. The conclusiveness of findings of fact by an administrative agency is not
affected by the fact that there was a wide difference of opinion among its members, or that some
of these members dissented. The court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency in making a finding of fact, and when
the evidence warrants the conclusions of the
administrative agency, the courts do not review."
Page 641:
"Sec. 216. REASONABLENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. Whether the reasonableness of administrative action is open to judicial review cannot 'be answered simply and generally' because the meaning of the term 'reasonableness' is not entirely clear and the courts are
not consistent in the use of the term. It is a
general rule that the question of the wisdom or
expediency of an administrative act is not to be
decided by the court, but by the administrative
body, and that the courts will not interfere with
a proper exercise of administrative discretion.''
14 Am. Jur., p. 392: This author, dealing with this

question of division of powers, under the subject of
''Courts,'' says:
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"Sec. 198. POWER OF JUDICIARY TO
INTER.FERE "\YITH OR CONTROL EXECUTIVE DEPART.JlENT. In the consideration of
the power of the judicial department to pass on
the acts of the legislative and executive departnlents, it is necessary to distinguish carefully the
power of the courts to control the legislative or
exooutiYe department by restraining or mandatory writs and the power of the court to review
an act of either department when properly presented in a judicial proceeding. It is generally
recognized that every act done or attempted to
be done by any officer of the executive department
in his official, and not in his individual, capacity,
is shielded from all judicial interference or control, either by mandamus or injunction, even
though such act may be founded in an error of
judgment or an ·entire misapprehension of the
official duty under the law. In other words, so
long as a public governing body acts within the
limits of its legal powers and jurisdiction, the
exercise of its judgment and discretion is not
subject to review or control by the courts at the
instance of citizens, taxpayers, or other interested
.persons, in the absence of a statute authorizing
such review or control.''
Idaho Power and Transp. Oo. v. Stephenson, State
E'fiJgineer (Ida.), 101 P. 821. Perhaps the point that
the courts may not control executive officers in the exercise of their discretion is sufficiently shown by the above.
However, this Idaho case was dealing directly with the

question of the ·state Engineer's fee on the final certificate of completion of a power plant and works. In
this connection, the opinion says:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

86
''Of course, if there was any question in
regard to the sufficiency of the proof of completion the State Engineer could not be required to
decide that such proof was sufficient, as his discretion in deciding that matter cannot be controlled hy mandate.''
This quotation, with other authority, is cited by Weil,
3rd Ed., p. 1110. At page 1119, the same author says:
''But, as considered in the foregoing ·chapter,
it is usually held that, while the decisions of the
water officials are entitled to great respect, and
in practice are not often disputed, yet the statute
cannot vest in them the finality of judicial powers,

........ :JI:"

Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 155
N.E. 628, 50 A.L.R. 1473. This case dealt with a contract made by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, and with the question of wages, as contained therein, and was for

~the

purpose of having the Court pass

upon their action.
'The opinion, by Justice Cardozo, held that the contract was not illegal because of the objections claimed,
and, on this general ·question of the exercise of discretion, said:
''Another fonn of contract might be more
expedient or cheaper. The Courts do not sit in
judgment upon questions of legislative policy or
administrative discretion. 'rhe taxpayer must
point to illegality or fraud.''
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CONCLUSION
"\Yhere Yested rights are dependent upon run-off and
drainage frmn prior use for direct and immediate irrigation, no case, so far as we can find, has 1permitted withholding for later irrigation under drier and hotter conditions. Injury to such dependent rights naturally results
from such withholding.
Here, the evidence is undisputed, and is indisputable, that this water if applied later, will be subject to
greater re-uses to the fullest extent right down to the
Lake. And, will be used to irrigate the large area adjacent to the Lake, which, in the high water season of
proposed withholding, is water-logged.
It is agreed by the experts, as it must 'be, that, in the
drier months, the evaporation of water, as exposed by
surface irrigation, will be much greater, and that loss
by transpiration, as the plant life is then fully developed, is substantially more than in May, when high water
is intended to be withheld here.
Also, it must be clear that there will be greater proportional loss from the necessarily smaller stream applications, and a consequent delay and lag. These things
are due to the very properties of water, and its natural
action.
For example, it is useless to deny tha:t water naturally runs down hill. Or, that it runs faster and farther
in large volume in a dry 'bed, or over dry ground, than
in small volume. Or, that it will run faster and farther
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nel, nr other soil, than ilt will over dry ones. And, in the
earlier and cooler season, when the water table is near,
or at, the surface, and the volume of flow is large, it is
apparent that there will be much smaller loss in transit.
No claim or argument can escape these natural conditions, and they establish substantial loss to the Lake
supply from this proposed operation, as well as the
necessary change in time of the availability of the water
to the users therefrom.
These things seem so plain, as to lead to the conclusion that the reversal below was based solely on the
finding that water had, in three out of many previous
years, spilled from Utah Lake. And, it seems obvious
to us that this was an error. That such waters are not
referred to in, or related to, the application here, and
cannot be reached by this character of application, at all.
Likewise, the contention that the right to operate
and control the changed distribution under the proposed
plan belongs to the respondents, and is not the responsibility of the State Engineer, seems to require no argument. This is answered by the statutes. Also, under the
decree here, any distribution, as the case now stands,
would have to be in accordance with the exact provisions
of the application filed, including the co>nCU~rrent storage
and release of water, its use over the whole 16,000-acre
area, when released, and, also, so released as to take
care of all power and o the'r rights entitled to water in
the area. So that respondents' intended purposes could,
apparently, not be carried out.
The only other conceivable basis of reversal of the
1
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State Engineer, as we have said, is a disagreement between the Court aJld this officer, as to a possible 1nethod
of ad1ninistration of the proposed plan, so as to prevent
(1) an increase of respondents' water right, without an
appropriation, or (2) interference with vested Lake
rights. The Engineer says there can be no feasible plan
of distribution, which will prevent these.
\Yhether it is claimed that some such method might
be conceived to avoid the natural effects of the plan, or
whether the plan presents impossible problems of distribution which cannot be overcome, so as to prevent
these results, are problems within the administrative
and control duties imposed by the Legislature upon the
Engineer. It does not seem to he within the power or
province of the Court to overrule this administrative
officer's determination of such matters, or to impose
upon him the duty to do things, purely administrative
in character, which he has determined he cannot do.
Such powers are not constitutionally granted to the
Courts.
And, if the Engineer cannot undertake, or discharge,
the statutory duties of administration under such proposed change applications as this, the applicant will, in
every such instance, inevitably gain an additional water
right, without any appropriation, and the lower vested
rights can have no assurance of the protection the statute
(100-3-3) guarantees: that ''no change shall be made if
it impairs any vested right,'' or have any protection.
We have refrained from discussing any technical
exceptions, taken on the Trial, because we are s~eking,
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by this appeal, the determination of the important questions of policy involved here. These are o'f vital importance to the Smte Engineer and the other appellants,
and are involved in the future administration of water
generally, in this State.
We respectfully submit tha;t the State Engineer's
decision should he sustained, and the decree of the ·Trial
Court reversed.
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